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The Long Environmental Justice
Movement
Jedediah Purdy*
The standpoint of environmental justice has become integral to
environmental law in the last thirty years. Environmental justice criticizes
mainstream environmental law and advocacy institutions on three main fronts:
for paying too little attention to the distributive effects of environmental policy;
for emphasizing elite and professional advocacy over participation in decision
making by affected communities; and for adhering to a woods-and-waters view
of which problems count as “environmental” that disregards the importance of
neighborhoods, workplaces, and cities. This Article highlights the existence of
a “long environmental justice movement” that, like the long movements for
racial equality and labor organizing, put questions of economic power and
distribution, democracy, and workplaces and neighborhoods at the center of
environmental politics for many decades before the watershed era of
environmental law making, 1970–77. The mystery is why this long
environmental justice movement did not have more effect on the mainstream
environmental law that arose in that period. The Article shows that we can
better understand the omissions of environmental justice concerns by
appreciating that mainstream environmental law was the last major legal
product of “the great exception,” the decades of the mid-twentieth century
when, unlike any other time in modern history, economic inequality was
declining and robust growth was widely shared. The assumptions of that time,
along with key contingent decisions by the Ford Foundation, labor unions, and
other early funders produced an environmental law that, more than much of the
preceding environmental politics, neglected questions of justice. To give both
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environmental law and environmental justice their due, we must both locate
environmental law within our new historical understanding of patterns of
economic inequality and recognize that environmental justice is a recovery and
extension of an essential and neglected strand of politics and law.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last thirty-five years, environmental justice has established itself as
an integral part of environmental law and politics. It has emphasized a pair of
themes. First, environmental justice movements and scholars have worked to
integrate considerations of distributive justice into areas of environmental law
that are otherwise treated in aggregative cost-benefit terms or governed by
other considerations—notably, but not only, the setting and enforcement of
pollution limits and the siting of hazardous facilities. A second key point of the
environmental justice perspective is that the scope of “environmental”
questions is not self-defining; the category’s boundaries are established by legal
and institutional work, from legislation to the creation and definition of the
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major institutions of environmental advocacy and expertise. This work, along
with political discourse and social movements, makes and remakes the
contested meanings of “environment.”
The themes of environmental justice are perennially important, but they
are particularly pertinent today, for two rather different reasons. First is a
reopening and intensification of problems related to distributive justice, broadly
understood. We now recognize that the period of economic history in which
today’s “mainstream environmentalism” took shape was a historical anomaly.
A new history of economic inequality has emerged in the last decade-plus,
most visibly in Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century.1 The
upshot of this work is that inequality has grown substantially in the last fortyplus years, with both income and wealth accumulating in the very highest
echelons. Moreover, substantial and growing inequality has turned out to be the
norm, rather than the exception, for most of the last two centuries. The most
prominent exception is the thirty-year period following World War II. This
discovery suggests that certain patterns of thought and practice that emerged in
that anomalous period may be products, not just of an exceptional time, but of
the mistaken supposition that it was no anomaly at all that economic inequality
had become a problem of the past.2 This point is particularly relevant to the
relationship to distributive justice to environmental law at large, in light of
environmental law’s emergence in the last anomalous years of widely shared
growth, the first half of the 1970s. Environmental law turns out to be deeply
shaped by the presupposition that trends toward economic equality, rather than
inequality, represented a “new normal.”
Second, the environmental justice commitment to an expansive conception
of “environment,” including institutions, built settings, and the social allocation
of resources, suits a moment when it is clearer than ever that there is no stable
or uncontroversial boundary between the social and the natural, nor any
creditable way to identify certain issues as inherently “environmental.” Many
earth scientists and other scholars contend that we have entered “the
Anthropocene,” a portmanteau term for a new geological “age of humanity” in
which human beings have become a force—perhaps the dominant force—
shaping the planet. In this view, environmental law is an aspect of world
making, part of a choice among futures in dimensions ranging from the
chemistry of the global atmosphere to the mix of species in existence to the
pattern of landscapes.3 Because what we still tend to call “the natural world” is

1. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 113–467 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014) (analyzing economic inequality over the past two centuries).
2. See Jedediah Purdy, Wealth and Democracy, in 58 NOMOS – AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, WEALTH 235–60 (Jack Knight & Elizabeth Schwartzberg eds.,
2017) (setting out this history and some of its implications for law and politics).
3. See generally JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE
(2015) (articulating this idea and relating it to the growth and current state of environmental law).
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a joint production of human activity and nonhuman forces, the boundaries of
what is “environmental” are not straightforward.
Environmental law nonetheless carries forward conceptions of “the
environment” and the role of distributive considerations in managing it that
formed in a particular moment, roughly the 1960s and early 1970s in the United
States, when a set of problems were newly grouped together under the label
“environmental”: pesticides and other toxins (but more as they affected “third
parties” than in their effects on agricultural workers); nuclear fallout (but not
other side effects of geopolitical conflict, such as the global proliferation of
inexpensive automatic weapons); litter (but not the decrepit condition of public
institutions in neglected neighborhoods); urban congestion and sprawl (but not
the prevalence of asthma or diabetes in poor communities); biodiversity (but
not yet the diversity of crops in agriculture and their relation to larger patterns
of ecological health); and the management of public lands (but not the
condition of public infrastructure).
Modern environmental law is very substantially the product of a burst of
legislation and institution-building that took place between the end of the 1960s
and the beginning of the 1980s. President Richard M. Nixon signed the
National Environmental Policy Act on January 1, 1970, created the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in December of that year, and signed
the Clean Air Act (CAA) on New Year’s Eve.4 In the ten years that followed,
Congress passed, among other statutes, the Clean Water Act (CWA),5 the
Endangered Species Act,6 laws governing the use and disposal of pesticides
and other toxic substances,7 comprehensive reform of federal public-lands
management,8 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.9 This
period of law making closed out with the 1980 adoption of the toxic-waste

4. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321‒4347 (2012)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401‒7671q); Reorganization Plan No. 3, 35 Fed. Reg.
15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 202 (2012), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing
the EPA).
5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251‒1387 (2012)) (colloquially known as the “Clean Water
Act”).
6. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531‒1544 (2012)).
7. Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136‒136y (2012)) (amending the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601‒2629 (2012)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901‒6987).
8. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701‒1787); National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614).
9. Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat.
445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201‒1328 (2012)).
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cleanup law commonly known as Superfund.10 Congress passed the 1970s
statutes by margins that today suggest typographic errors: only 1 vote against
the 1970 CAA in all of Congress; average votes of 76 to 5 in the Senate and
331 to 30 in the House for major environmental statutes.11 The new laws
greatly expanded the federal government’s regulation of private industry and
land use, from smokestacks and waste disposal to wetlands management and
pest control. New environmental statutes also transformed the federal
government’s management of the land it controls directly, more than a quarter
of the country’s acreage, by requiring new attention to ecological principles and
making biodiversity lexically superior to other goals in some circumstances.12
The same years saw the formation of the advocacy organizations and
centers of professional expertise that do much to shape environmental law. The
Environmental Law Institute, the key professional clearinghouse for the field,
was founded in 1969, and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
arguably the touchstone modern environmental group, was created in 1970. The
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the think-tank Resources for the
Future already existed but were substantially built up in these years, when they
moved their previous science-and-policy missions toward the emerging field of
environmental law, as defined by the post-1970 statutes. Longstanding
organizations such as the Sierra Club became mass-membership groups and
built up litigation arms that followed NRDC’s example.13
The ways that environmental law was institutionalized in this period—in
statutes and agencies, but also in professional and advocacy organizations—
matter because the precise contours of “environmental” problems have always
been contested.14 The field lacks the textual basis of constitutional law, the

10. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601‒9675).
11. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 69 (2004).
12. The Endangered Species Act obliges the federal government to avoid action that
“jeopardize[s]” listed species, while the National Forest Management Act enhances the conservation and
ecological elements of federal forest management. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 87 Stat. at 892
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536); National Forest Management Act of 1976 § 2, 90 Stat. at
2949–50 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1600). The National Environmental Policy Act’s
application to “major” federal actions also required significant new attention to such questions. National
Environmental Policy Act § 102, 83 Stat. at 853 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332).
13. These developments are discussed in Parts II.C and IV.C, infra.
14. I have developed this argument, which forms the methodological starting point of this Article,
in three previous articles. See Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for
Environmental Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 857, 883–905 (2013) (arguing that political contests over
the scope and purposes of environmental law substantially account for the question of which ethical
frameworks have application in the field); Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in
Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 215–25 (2012) (mapping statutes, doctrinal
disputes, and political conflicts over environmental questions onto a typology of environmental
worldviews that are embodied or exemplified in certain eras of law making in the field); Jedediah Purdy,
The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122,
1125–32 (2010) (arguing for the primacy of a politically achieved definition of scope and priorities of
environmental law, in hindsight and prospectively). I also developed this argument in After Nature: A
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clear topical remit of tax or antitrust, and the doctrinal coherence of contract or
tort. Built on a variety of agency-spanning statutes, addressed to problems that
might be gathered under the slogan “everything is connected,” it has always
oscillated between a sense of self-evidence—of course these problems are
environmental!—and a propensity to identity crisis.15 Do environmental
problems centrally include the threat of nuclear conflict and the question of
population policy, as a landmark statement by major environmental groups
suggested in 1985?16 Do environmental concerns imply engagement with
immigration policy, as many Sierra Club members and leaders argued during a
notorious and movement-defining conflict in the 1990s and thereafter?17 Do
they centrally concern the governance of food systems, which did not figure
much in early formulations of environmental law, but have attracted eager
attention in recent years?18 These questions are not likely to find conceptual or
empirical resolution. Answers come instead from the network of laws, public
and nonprofit institutions, and movements whose efforts form the field of
environmental law.
This Article offers a reassessment of a defining contest over the scope and
priorities of environmental law that emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s. The
catalyst for this contest was the critique of “mainstream environmentalism” in a
series of challenges that, taken together, formed a movement and school of
thought called “environmental justice.” Environmental justice advocates
charged mainstream environmentalism with indifference to the distributive
consequences of environmental policy, especially where the burdens of
pollution and other harms followed familiar racial and socioeconomic lines of
vulnerability and marginalization; parochial attachment to a woods-and-waters
version of the core problems of environmental law, in which humans,
especially socially vulnerable people, were too often secondary; and excessive
Politics for the Anthropocene. See generally PURDY, supra note 3. This paper falls within the sequence
of that earlier work.
15. Although the EPA administers a great deal of environmental law, significant responsibility
also falls to the Department of Interior (the Fish and Wildlife Service administers most of the
Endangered Species Act; the Bureau of Land Management and National Park Service are responsible for
much public-lands policy; and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement administers
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act), the Department of Agriculture (which contains the
Forest Service, which is responsible for the national forests, and takes lead responsibility for shaping
farmers’ land use through subsidies and conservation programs), the Department of Commerce (which is
responsible for fisheries management and the application of the Endangered Species Act to marine life),
the Army Corps of Engineers (which administers and enforces permits to fill wetlands and waterways, in
conjunction with the EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (overseeing safety in the food
system, which, as this paper discusses later, has increasingly entered the circle of environmental
concerns). For a reflection on the multifariousness of environmental law, see generally J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975 (2013).
16. See JOHN H. ADAMS ET AL., AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 25–39 (1985).
17. See Felicity Barringer, Bitter Division for Sierra Club on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/us/bitter-division-for-sierra-club-on-immigration.html?_r
=0.
18. See infra Part V.
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comfort with elite and professionalized advocacy, in contrast to the popular
mobilization and participation that were central to other social movements in
the 1960s and 1970s.19
The environmental justice movement (more accurately, movements) made
incisive points about the limitations and blind spots of mainstream
environmentalism. But for mainstream environmentalism to attract these
critiques, something else had to happen first: the retreat of environmental
politics from an earlier and long-running engagement with issues of power and
justice in the human environment. The mainstream environmentalism that
attracted the key early environmental justice critiques had emerged not long
before from a “great forgetting,” an eclipse of strands of environmentalism
concerned centrally with justice, power, and the human setting writ large.20
Recalling what was eclipsed is the beginning of recovering a long
environmental justice movement.
Environmentalism’s “great forgetting” happened in two stages. First, in
the 1950s and 1960s, key activists and organizations, signally Rachel Carson
and the Wilderness Society, forged a contemporary environmentalism from an
earlier, multifarious set of research, reform, and activist agendas, many of them
concerned with urban neighborhoods, industrial health, and economic power.
The result was a relatively narrow definition of “environmental” concerns that
flowered in the late 1960s and early 1970s, both informing the major
environmental statutes and institutions and, in a pattern of mutual support,
finding confirmation in them. The institutions and agendas that become central
in this period often reflected a then-leading view of the role of legal advocacy
in social reform. This was an idealistic but also distinctly apolitical stance that I
call “legal liberalism,” which the Ford Foundation played a key role in
institutionalizing in the new environmental groups, and which consolidated a
distinctly elite and technocratic profile for the movement.
Although the decisions of advocates and organizations were important in
this development, the narrowing of environmentalism’s scope was also enabled
by a larger set of historical conditions. The mid-twentieth century was marked
by relatively egalitarian distribution of both income and wealth, which fostered
the impression that economic inequality was a problem substantially solved.
This, in turn, supported a certain complacency about the distributional
consequences of environmental law that environmental justice advocates would
19. This last point has seemed especially ironic because mass mobilization was present at the
beginning of modern environmentalism, when, in 1970, more than ten million Americans participated in
the first Earth Day. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 225–26 (2006).
20. With this term, I am indicating the resonance between this argument and the historical
interpretation that Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath have advanced in their manuscript on the “great
forgetting” of egalitarian constitutional political economy during the period after the New Deal. See
Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An Introduction to
the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1295–98 (2016)
(advancing their interpretation of the “great forgetting”).
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later highlight. The demotion of distributive considerations, workplace
conditions, and other issues of power and social disparity among the priorities
of environmentalism did not reflect indifference to those questions per se, but
rather the conviction that environmental law and policy could take for granted
that other forces would address those questions independently.
The second stage of narrowing and forgetting happened once the new
environmental statutes were enacted and environmental advocacy and
professional institutions were up and running. Throughout the 1970s, there
were opportunities for environmental law and advocacy to join forces with
social movements that linked “environmental” questions with racial justice,
neighborhood health, workplace organization, and economic power. None of
these opportunities came to fruition. It was not really until the end of the 1970s
or beginning of the 1980s that “mainstream environmentalism” was
institutionally consolidated in the form that the environmental justice
movement criticized. It took lasting form just in time to be criticized as the
avatar of a perennial (and parochial) environmentalism.
Why should we care? There is a gain in clarity in understanding the ways
that certain institutions and intellectual practices that we take for granted
because we were born into them are, in fact, the products of an anomalous
twentieth-century exception to the longstanding place of economic inequality in
American legal and political contests.21 But understanding the context in which
the contrast between “mainstream environmentalism” and environmental
justice arose is only the beginning of a conjoined project of historical recovery
and contemporary reorientation. Much as students of law and social movements
have come to appreciate the “long civil rights movement,” and have been
reminded of the long and multifarious history of the labor movement outside
the structure of the National Labor Relations Act, historical reorientation here
reveals a long movement for environmental justice.22 The value of recognizing
21. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 61, 68–70 (2017) (advancing the argument that conventional divisions between public and
private law and features of substantive areas such as constitutional law and antitrust are products of the
great exception); Jedediah Purdy, Overcoming the Great Forgetting: A Comment on Fishkin and
Forbath, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1415, 1416–17 (2016) (locating the revival of a left-leaning “constitutional
political economy” in the new awareness of long-term trends in economic inequality); David Singh
Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,
2014, at 1, 21–23 (arguing that the critical political economy of law implied in the concept of
“neoliberalism” takes fresh relevance from new awareness of economic inequality).
22. See, e.g., ADRIANE LENTZ-SMITH, FREEDOM STRUGGLES: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND WORLD
WAR I 2–4 (2009) (arguing for the importance of the First World War as a crucible of black activism and
resistance); MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR
NEW YORK CITY (2003) (describing black resistance to various forms of second-class citizenship in the
1940s and early 1950s as an alternative history of postwar civil rights); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long
Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1235–61 (2005)
(describing the long black freedom movement, the specific form of it that became the mid-century Civil
Rights Movement, and the subsequent hindsight contest over the meaning of that movement). On labor,
see ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR AND
REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 97–137 (2015) (tracing a long history of “labor
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the long environmental justice movement is akin to that of other (re)discoveries
of “long” histories. It highlights that the familiar form of that movement, and
the body of law with which we associate it, is a relatively recent creation, and a
selective one, which foregrounds certain themes of the long movement and
neglects or obscures others. A long history of a movement may become a
source of a usable past: roads not taken or long overgrown may suggest future
paths.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the rise in the
1980s of a movement and body of scholarship under the rubric of
environmental justice, with particular attention to grassroots anti-toxics
campaigns and mobilization against racially disparate hazards, especially in the
siting of waste facilities. It characterizes the core critique of “mainstream”
environmental law from the environmental justice perspective: its relative
indifference to distributive questions, its attachment to a narrow conception of
“the environment,” and its comfort with elite and professionalized forms of
advocacy. Part II seeks to account for these omissions and deficiencies in
mainstream environmental law by situating the creation of the statutes and
institutions that constitute much of that law within three defining phenomena of
the 1960s and early 1970s: the existence and expectation of relatively equitable
distribution of income and wealth; legal liberalism’s culture of professionalized
and heavily procedural advocacy, particularly influential in the Ford
Foundation’s involvement in forming environmental-law institutions; and the
capacity to found Equal Protection suits on disparate impacts from facially
neutral laws, which provided a potential check on structural inequality before
the Supreme Court rejected such actions in 1976 and the years immediately
following. Together, these help to explain why legislators such as Maine
Senator Edmund Muskie, a leading architect of the CAA, both showed great
sensitivity to environmental justice themes and failed to integrate distributive
fairness into the statutes they wrote. In light of contemporaneous expectations,
these statutes struck their authors as being environmental justice laws; that
context, however, did not long survive their enactment.
Part III shows that there would have been nothing alien to twentiethcentury environmentalism in engaging issues of distribution, economic power,
or political accountability. On the contrary, such iconic sources of mainstream
environmentalism as the Wilderness Society and the industrial toxicology
movement that underlay Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring were intensely
concerned with these themes, which were eclipsed during a thematic
compression of “environmentalism” during the 1960s. I speculate that this
republicanism” that linked control of economic life with self-government generally, giving special
attention to the decades after the Civil War); MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 49–78 (1995) (exploring the Knights of Labor and nineteenth-century labor
radicalism); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 962–66 (1997)
(describing labor activists’ conception of the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, in particular for
their program).
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compression had to do with the political and cultural would-be consensus of the
Cold War, as well as expectation of relatively egalitarian economic growth.
Part IV shows that even in the 1970s, as the statutes and institutions of
mainstream environmental law were being built up in the form that the
environmental justice movement came to criticize, there were other, more
egalitarian and grassroots strands of environmental politics, notably both
established and insurgent labor-union voices and Nader-ite advocacy
organizations. It was not until the 1980s that the agenda of mainstream
environmentalism reached its most uncontentious and homogeneous form—and
environmental justice claimants arose to challenge and diversify it. Part V
brings the commitments of the long environmental justice movement into the
present as a lens to consider the emerging issue of food systems, taking this as a
model for integration of justice with more conventional environmental
concerns. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
In roughly the last two decades, environmental justice has become an
integral aspect of environmental law and politics. A set of premises distinguish
environmental justice, as a perspective and as a movement, from the
“mainstream environmentalism” that is associated with the shaping and passage
of major environmental statutes between 1970 and 1977, and with the advocacy
organizations that emerged in that period, such as NRDC and EDF.23 One
premise concerns the scope of problems that should be conceived of as
“environmental.” As Sheila Foster and the late Luke Cole put it, “the
environment is where we live, where we work, where we play, and where we
learn”—in other words, neighborhoods, workplaces, and public institutions, in
addition and in contrast to traditional environmentalism’s focus on such
“natural” phenomena as waterways, forests, and nonhuman species.24 This is a
distinctly social and institutional definition of “environment,” in which the
artificial human habitat figures equally with the natural one. A second defining
premise of environmental justice is that environmental policies should be
assessed in light of their distributive consequences, particularly where the
distribution of environmental harms and benefits tracks other contours of socioeconomic inequality, such as race and class.25 By contrast, Cole and Foster

23. One might add the Sierra Club, which was founded in 1892 but underwent significant
membership growth and expansion of its mission in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
24. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND
THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 16 (2001). Luke Cole, an environmental justice
lawyer who died in a car accident in Uganda in 2009, is admiringly remembered in the environmental
justice community.
25. As Michael Gerrard puts it, while there is “no universally accepted definition of
environmental justice,” a strong candidate for a core overlapping idea is “that minority and low-income
individuals, communities, and populations should not be disproportionately exposed to environmental
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write, “the traditional environmental law community has largely ignored” these
questions, partly because of a cultural attachment to a narrow definition of
environmental topics, partly owing to “[r]acism and other prejudices.”26 A third
premise is that environmental decision making should be inclusive. Whether
this means regarding political participation as a potentially transformative site
of community empowerment or asserting the humbler principle that vulnerable
communities “should share fully in making the decisions that affect their
environment,” it stands in contrast to traditional environmentalism’s comfort
with specialized advocacy in judicial and administrative forums.27
The theoretical commitments that characterize the perspective of
environmental justice also express its origins in community activism. More
specifically, environmental justice claims have important roots in two
developments of the late 1970s and the 1980s: the toxics movement and the rise
of civil rights-style mobilization around “environmental racism.” The toxics
movement, a loose network of grassroots and often blue-collar anti-pollution
campaigns, had its grim paradigm in the discovery that some 22,000 barrels of
discarded toxic waste had entered the soil and water supply of residential
neighborhoods and a public school in Love Canal, New York, visiting
perceived high rates of leukemia, miscarriages, and chromosome damage on
mostly working-class residents.28 Although they eventually drew the support of
the Carter Administration and helped to spur the passage of Superfund
legislation, Lois Gibbs and her Love Canal neighbors were largely ignored by
local officials and the Hooker Chemical Company during several years of
grassroots investigative work and self-advocacy.29 Love Canal’s problems
became emblematic as communities around the country confronted the buried,
hazards[.]” THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS xxxiii (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008).
26. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 30; see also EDWARDO LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A NEW PARADIGM 30 (2003) (“[M]ainstream environmental organizations have
tended to focus on things, rather than people. People have been treated almost as a homogenous mass: if
one benefits, all benefit.”). Although Rhodes sets aside as “too simplistic” the view that “the mainstream
environmental movement is simply racist and too middle-class” to address environmental justice
concerns, he argues for a culturally essentializing historical view of the environmental movement as
marked by an “antiurban bias” inherited from Romanticism, in which people “turned their backs on the
cities and ran to the woods.” Id. at 35, 38.
27. See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 25; see also COLE & FOSTER, supra
note 24, at 14–15 (offering the more ambitious view that “[i]ndividuals are transformed” and
“communit[ies] [are] transformed” by environmental justice mobilization); id. at 28–30 (identifying the
“traditional environmental movement” with elite and insider advocacy).
28. Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism for the Next Economy, in LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW
ECONOMY: SUSTAINABLE, JUST, AND DEMOCRATIC 50, 58 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017). Subsequent
epidemiological research has called into question whether these disorders were in fact markedly elevated
in Love Canal, but have not diminished the emblematic significance of the place or the events identified
with it. See, e.g., Lenore J. Gensburg et al., Cancer Incidence among Former Love Canal Residents, 117
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1265, 1269–70 (2009) (finding no significant difference between cancer rates in
Love Canal and those for the general population of New York State for most types of cancer, and
expressing uncertainty about causation, especially in light of small numbers).
29. See Purdy, supra note 28, at 58.

44.4 PURDY V2 FOR JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

820

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

4/3/18 1:07 PM

[Vol. 44:809

often half-forgotten legacy of several decades of largely unregulated chemical
waste disposal that followed World War II.30
The problem was not restricted to legacy pollution. New regimes for
dealing with both hazardous waste and ordinary municipal trash seemed to
follow familiar lines of least political and economic resistance. Controversy
around one siting decision is conventionally credited with raising the political
profile of “environmental racism.” In 1982, North Carolina’s government
selected a tract of state-owned land in Warren County, a rural, poor, and
majority-black county in the state’s coastal plain, for disposal of soil
contaminated by the illegal roadside dumping of 31,000 gallons of PCBcontaminated oil. The oil’s owners had deposited it along some 240 miles of
state roads rather than disposing of it in an approved facility. County residents
did not succeed in stopping the landfill, but they drew national attention with
protests that included blocking dump trucks with their bodies, and in which
more than 500 people were arrested.31 Five years later, the Commission for
Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ issued one of the canonical
documents of environmental justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United
States.32 The report presented evidence that hazardous waste facilities were
disproportionately located in minority communities, and called this pattern a
“form of racism.”33 Nearly three decades of subsequent research have split over
the existence, degree, and sources of racially disproportionate hazards siting,
but more refined methods have generally found correlation, and recent work
suggests specific mechanisms of causation.34
Both episodes saw popular mobilization arise outside the arrangements of
official decision making and established advocacy organizations that had

30.
31.
32.

Id.
COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 21.
COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN
THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
33. Id. at x.
34. Compare Paul Mohai & Robin Saha, Which Came First, People or Pollution? Assessing the
Disparate Siting and Post-Siting Demographic Change Hypotheses of Environmental Injustice, 10
ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, no. 11, 2015, at 1, 14–16, http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1009&context=environstudies_pubs (finding disparities in siting decisions, which they argue are
best explained by a combination of racial discrimination and “path of least resistance” political
economy, in which neighborhoods already in racial transition are likely to lack political wherewithal to
resist undesirable land uses), and John R. Hipp & Cynthia M. Lakon, Social Disparities in Health:
Disproportionate Toxicity Proximity in Minority Communities over a Decade, 16 HEALTH & PLACE 674,
680–82 (2010) (finding disparities in siting decisions), with Lori M. Hunter et al., Environmental
Hazards, Migration, and Race, 25 POPULATION & ENV’T 23, 37 (2003) (not finding disparities in siting,
a conclusion supporting the view that post-siting market dynamics account for disparities in
demographics near hazardous sites). The debate over causation is obviously very important both for the
issue of intentional discrimination and as a matter of the design of legal responses. It probably did not
matter so much to many of the originators of “environmental racism” arguments, as they tended to see
disparate impacts as a form of racial wrong, and to see market mediation as the typical form of unjust
disparity.
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emerged from the environmental law making and activism of the 1970s. The
movements’ working-class and African American makeup sharply
distinguished them from what the 1987 UCC report called traditional
environmentalism’s “white middle and upper-class” constituency.35 The early
environmental justice movements’ motives tended to be local, self-protective,
and immediate; members felt themselves in danger of poisoning, and their
requests for official attention had met indifferent response. Environmental
justice activists did not appeal mainly to the costs-and-burdens balancing
version of social rationality that was then taking a central place in the
economics-oriented wing of mainstream environmentalism and among agency
decision makers. Their argument was closer to the ground; whatever process
had led to the dumping, concealment, or siting decision that immediately
jeopardized them was suspect because of its fruits: a concretely felt threat that,
typically, fit a pattern of social vulnerability and official indifference.36
In the early 1990s, mainstream environmental institutions began to
incorporate environmental justice themes. After a 1990 University of Michigan
conference on “Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards,” a group of
environmental justice activists and scholars met with EPA head William Reilly,
who formed an “Environment and Equity” working group at the agency.37 Two
years later, the working group filed an equivocal report, finding disparate
exposure to pollution burdens among nonwhite populations, but raising a
variety of questions about the sources of exposure and its relation to ultimate
health problems.38 The report raised the ire of environmental justice critics, and
Representative Henry Waxman of California denounced it as a “public relations
ploy.”39 This exchange set up the environmental justice movement for a more
satisfactory result two years later, in 1994, when President Clinton issued
Executive Order 12898, which directs all federal agencies to “make achieving
environmental justice part of [their] mission by identifying and addressing . . .

35.
36.

COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, supra note 32, at xi.
See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 12–13 (arguing for the importance of “grassroots
experiences” in the environmental justice perspective).
37. See ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at 38
(2007) (recounting the early history of “environmental racism” arguments and scholarship).
38. EPA, EPA-230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL
COMMUNITIES 3 (1992).
39. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 804 n.64 (1993). In the same period, January 1990,
environmental justice groups wrote an open letter to the major environmental advocacy groups,
documenting their small share of nonwhite leaders and senior staffers. The letter, which also appeared in
the New York Times in early February, prompted quick responses from some environmentalist leaders.
Fred Krupp, executive director of EDF, confessed, “environmental groups have done a miserable job of
reaching out to minorities.” DORCETA E. TAYLOR, THE STATE OF DIVERSITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS 31‒33 (2014). Nonetheless, a follow-up study in 2014 found that over 88 percent of
broadly defined “leadership positions” in environmental organizations were still occupied by white
people. Id. at 50‒52.
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disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects . . .
on minority . . . and low-income populations.”40
Executive Order 12898 is in itself a rather small victory on the stage of
federal law. Its requirements are strictly procedural, and unlike other procedural
duties that form important parts of environmental law practice, courts have held
that the disparate impacts to which it draws agencies’ attention do not form the
basis of individual causes of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.41
The idea of environmental justice has, nonetheless, gained a significant
foothold across environmental policy and politics. Many states have adopted
environmental justice policies of various degrees of rigor.42 No environmental
group or agency will profess indifference to environmental justice, and groups
such as Earthjustice and NRDC have made significant commitments to it.43
These commitments involve both substantive choice of cases and the
procedures of attorney-client relations, which advocates, particularly but not
40.
41.

Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that disparate-impact
regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act do not give rise to
individual causes of action). By contrast, enforcement of planning and assessment requirements under
the National Environmental Policy Act figures prominently in environmental litigation. See, e.g.,
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 795 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that
petitioners sought to challenge the government’s predator damage management activities in Nevada and
its failure to prepare a Nevada-specific environmental impact statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act).
42. California has adopted no fewer than nine statutes directing state agencies to attend to
environmental justice concerns in their planning, and these have been enforced in individual suits. See,
e.g., Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 226–27 (Ct.
App. 2004) (finding the environmental impact reports for proposed retail shopping centers to be
deficient under the California Environmental Quality Act). Massachusetts prioritizes environmental
justice communities (defined as those with relatively high levels of either minority residents or lowincome households) for cleanup funds, inspection, and enforcement under executive policy, and
commits itself pointedly to a definition of “equal protection” as the principle that “no group of people,
because of race, ethnicity, class, gender, or handicap bears an unfair share of environmental
pollution . . . or have [sic] limited access to natural resources, including greenspace (open space) and
water resources.” MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
POLICY OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 3 (Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.mass.
gov/eea/docs/eea/ej/ej-policy-english.pdf. Many states’ policies roughly track the directive of Executive
Order 12898. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629.
43. See, e.g., Healthy Communities, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/healthy-communities
(last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (providing an overview of Earthjustice’s commitment to ensuring clean air
and water, protecting people from pesticides, and generally safeguarding vulnerable communities from
health threats); Environmental Justice, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/environmental-justice
(last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (explaining the Sierra Club’s environmental justice mission to “discuss and
explore the linkages between environmental quality and social justice, and to promote dialogue,
increased understanding, and appropriate action”); Environmental Justice, NRDC, https://www.nrdc.org
/about/environmental-justice (last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (including a list of dedicated attorneys);
Environmental Justice Data Now Online for Every U.S. Community, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Apr. 18, 2001),
https://www.edf.org/news/environmental-justice-data-now-online-every-us-community (detailing EDF’s
program to accumulate and distribute data on geographic disparities in environmental hazards). While
there are differences, and my subjective impression is that NRDC stands out in this respect, more than
twenty years of being in and out of environmental movement spaces and among environmental law
students tend to persuade me that heartfelt commitment to environmental justice is widespread.
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only younger ones, have worked to make more collaborative with local
communities than an older model that today’s attorneys describe in hindsight as
“swooping down with an agenda.”44 Environmental justice claims have entered
the lexicon of advocacy, where their uses range from mobilizing constituents to
drawing media attention. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such claims have
made a difference in more siting and funding disputes than a review of the
Federal Register would reveal.45
Environmental justice is now a part of environmental law and politics. Its
practical consequences, however, have been somewhat uncertain and slow
moving, while its import for the field as a whole remains ambiguous; is it a
supplemental consideration mainly relevant to implementing familiar goals, or
a continuing challenge to the identity and priorities of environmental law and
politics?
The argument that follows is that the importance of environmental justice
in environmental law is not all it might be, and that examining the
circumstances in which it emerged can illuminate why that is so.
II. SOURCES OF SILENCE: THE OMISSION OF JUSTICE FROM
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental justice challenged “mainstream environmentalism” along
several dimensions. It insisted on the importance of the distribution of benefits
and burdens under the pollution-control statutes and other laws passed in the
early 1970s at the opening of the modern era of environmental law. It criticized
traditional environmentalism for taking “natural” places and systems as the
paradigms of environmental concern, leaving at the periphery Cole and Foster’s
places “where we live . . . work . . . play, and . . . learn.” Environmental justice
advocates also criticized environmental organizations for their focus on and
comfort with elite forms of advocacy driven by professional expertise, in
contrast to popular participation and grassroots mobilization. Many of these
critics regarded traditional environmentalism as both parochial and privileged,
the inheritor of a woods-and-waters political aesthetic that led the Sierra Club
in 1971 to describe incipient environmental justice concerns as “the

44. Emails from Mitchell Bernard, Litig. Dir., Nat. Res. Def. Council, to author (July 2015) (on
file with author).
45. Already in 1994, pioneering environmental justice litigator Luke Cole argued that, because
“the struggles in the environmental justice movement are primarily political and economic struggles, not
legal ones,” even suits with poor prospects of technically prevailing could be worth bringing for
purposes of mobilizing communities, attracting publicity, and framing structural disparities in
environmental benefits and burdens as civil-rights issues, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court
declined to treat them as denials of equal protection within the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 523, 541–44 (1994).

44.4 PURDY V2 FOR JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

824

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

4/3/18 1:07 PM

[Vol. 44:809

conservation problems of such special groups as the urban poor and ethnic
minorities.”46
This conventional story is important but incomplete. The “traditional
environmentalism” that served as the defining foil for environmental justice
was neither timeless nor inevitable. It was the product of several distinctive
features of American political economy, legal culture, and the environmental
movement in the second half of the twentieth century.
A. The Post-War Anomaly and the Forgetting of Economic Inequality
In the period from roughly 1946 to 1973, high levels of economic growth
coincided with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income and wealth,
producing the widely shared impression that economic inequality was a
problem substantially solved.47 In this generation-long experience (and longerlasting perception) of inclusive growth as a “new normal,” political elites
characterized the remaining challenges of economic disparity as problems of
exclusion, not inequality. Certain marginalized populations, signally African
Americans and Appalachian whites, were understood to have suffered
exclusion from a system of general benefit on account of structural injustice
and explicit discrimination, but those who were dealt into the system could
expect to share in its benefits.48 From this perspective, economic participation,
once purged of its exclusionary elements, should be expected to overcome, not
reproduce, historical inequality. Thus, even in a time of great reformist energy,
public-interested policy making could plausibly set aside most considerations
46. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 30. The phrasing appeared in a survey of members, 58
percent of whom responded that they either somewhat opposed or strongly opposed the Club’s
concerning itself with such questions. Id.; see also RHODES, supra note 26, at 36–40.
47. See PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 304–76 (advancing this finding).
48. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 76 (1958) (noting that “as an
economic and social goal, inequality has been declining in urgency . . . [because of] increas[ed]
production . . . [which is] an alternative to redistribution or even to the reduction of inequality. The
oldest and most agitated of social issues, if not resolved, is at least largely in abeyance”); id. at 252–55
(concluding, nonetheless, that “poverty does survive,” especially in the form of “insular poverty”
characterized by an “island [where] everyone or nearly everyone is poor,” exemplified by black and
white Southerners, “urban slum[s],” and Appalachia). As one piece of evidence for the persistence of
this impression, Galbraith, in the original 1958 edition of The Affluent Society, flatly asserted that
economic inequality was declining, and hung a great deal of his analysis on that fact. Id. at 76. In
subsequent revisions through 1984, he acknowledged that his analysis could no longer be attributed to
falling inequality, as it was in fact growing, and responded by amplifying the role of ancillary cultural
and psychological considerations in his argument. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY
xxii–xxiv (4th ed. 1984) (highlighting his failure to foresee the “worsening balance” of private
consumption to public services as seen in “the modern metropolis”); see also President Lyndon B.
Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan (May 22, 1964) (“The Great Society”) (arguing that,
after fifty years of “unbounded invention and untiring industry to create an order of plenty for all of our
people,” the challenge was now “to use that wealth to enrich and advance our national life, and to
advance the quality of our American civilization”); President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to
the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964) (calling for a “war on poverty . . . in city slums and
small towns, in sharecropper shacks or in migrant worker camps, on Indian Reservations, among whites
as well as Negroes” and with special attention to “the chronically distressed areas of Appalachia”).
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of distributive inequality in confidence that these would, so to speak, take care
of themselves in a properly functioning economy.
As environmental justice critics have charged, the major environmental
statutes do not address the prospect that their benefits and burdens might turn
out to be unequally distributed in ways that add to cumulative disadvantage.
They do not provide measures to avert disparate impact, whether from siting
hazardous activities in poor or nonwhite localities, market-mediated migration
as people with money avoid environmental hazards and the poor end up
clustered near them, or accumulation as today’s permissible levels of hazards
interact with high baselines of toxicity or other dangers among vulnerable
populations.
What do these omissions reveal about the statutes and the attitudes of
those who wrote them? The statutes’ authors were on notice of environmental
justice concerns, and they did not ignore them. During debates on the CAA of
1970, Senator Edmund Muskie, its chief architect, felt compelled to respond to
a book-length “Nader Report” that took to task the government’s clean air
policy and “palliative” solutions.49 The report, titled Vanishing Air, focused on
“the environmental violence” suffered by severely polluted blue-collar
communities, often in relatively economically marginal states such as West
Virginia and Maine, in service of an argument that “air pollution is a new way
of looking at an old American problem; concentrated and irresponsible
corporate power.”50 Although Muskie’s response concentrated on defending
the CAA’s national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) against the
emissions-based standards that Nader favored, elsewhere in the spring of 1970,
Muskie offered a more expansive picture of the social purpose of anti-pollution
laws.51 On the first Earth Day, speaking in Philadelphia, he argued that “man’s
environment includes more than . . . natural resources. It includes the shape of
the communities in which he lives: his home, his schools, his places of
work.”52 Arguing for protection of the “total environment,” he insisted that
“the only kind of society that has a chance” is “a society that will not tolerate
slums for some and decent houses for others, rats for some and playgrounds for
others, clean air for some and filth for others.”53 Muskie linked the
environmental crisis rhetorically to the War on Poverty, to the Great Society
49. JOHN C. ESPOSITO & LARRY J. SILVERMAN, VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION 299–310 (1970) (contrasting solutions that address the “disparity”
between people and polluters and mere “palliatives”).
50. Id. at 293–94, 299; see also id. at 121–29 (detailing Union Carbide’s pollution in the Ohio
Valley of West Virginia and the ineffectiveness and venality of local and state government’s
involvement in enforcement efforts); id. at 294–98 (discussing pollution in New Cumberland, West
Virginia, and Rumford, Maine).
51. See 116 CONG. REC. 15,608 (1970) (memorializing a statement made by Sen. Muskie at a
news conference on May 13, 1970); 120 CONG. REC. 11,324–25 (1974) (memorializing a speech made
by Sen. Muskie on April 22, 1970, in Fairmount Park, Philadelphia).
52. 120 CONG. REC. 11,325.
53. Id.
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idea that the country’s challenge had changed from achieving prosperity to
building widely shared flourishing within affluence, and to the Civil Rights
Movement, concluding, “For Martin Luther King, every day was an Earth
Day—a day to work toward his commitment to a whole society.”54 This was
presumably the line of argument that Muskie had in mind the previous evening
at Harvard’s Earth Day teach-in, where he said, “Those who believe that the
environmental crisis [is] related to trees and not people are wrong. Those who
believe that we are talking about the Grand Canyon and the Catskills, but not
Harlem and Watts are wrong.”55
Does the design of the major environmental statutes give the lie to these
sentiments, or do the statutes represent a version of what its sponsors thought
necessary to implement these ideas? The Senate Report on the CAA and
Muskie’s floor statements in support of the bill suggest the latter. In hearings
and in challenges from the Nader organizations, the Senate had heard several
kinds of complaints about the distribution of environmental harms. One
focused on lack of enforcement under previous anti-pollution legislation,
especially in areas that were economically dependent on polluting industries: in
line with the arguments of Vanishing Air, Representative Ken Hechler of West
Virginia had given Muskie’s sub-committee a vivid rendition of Union
Carbide’s evasion of regulatory efforts in the Ohio River Valley.56 Second was
the charge, especially emphatic from the Nader groups, that the bill’s focus on
NAAQS left too much room for administrative evasion, and should be replaced
54. Id. Muskie had earlier compared the “war” on “poverty” and “hunger” with “another war” on
“the pollution of our environment,” then insisted that only creating “a whole society,” in King’s sense,
which he defined as a “healthy total environment,” could count as victory. Id. He also argued, in terms
closely akin to those of Galbraith’s The Affluent Society, that “[o]ur technology has reached a point
where it is producing more kinds of things than we really want, more kinds of things than we really
need, and more kinds of things than we can really live with” and that this condition represented “a moral
frontier” where material increase must be exchanged for a society “in which all men live in
brotherhood . . . where each member of it knows that he has an opportunity to fulfill his greatest
potential.” Id.
55. 116 CONG. REC. 15,705 (1970) (memorializing excerpts of a speech made by Sen. Muskie at
Harvard University on April 21, 1970). Earlier that year, Senator Muskie made the same argument in a
Chicago address:
[M]an’s environment includes the shape of the communities in which he lives, his home, his
schools, his places of work, his modes of transportation and his society. . . . [Our priorities
should be reordered to address] [t]he economic imbalance which has caused the population
shifts which now so deeply trouble our American cities. The adequacy of housing and
services both in urban and rural America. The availability of health services. The
conservation of natural resources. The availability of recreational opportunities in and around
our cities . . . none of these can be said to be any less important or basically more important
than the crisis of the environment. They are, indeed, a part of the environment.
116 CONG. REC. 3527–28 (1970) (memorializing a speech made by Sen. Muskie in Chicago on January
17, 1970)).
56. Air Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public
Health & Welfare of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce on H.R. 12934, H.R. 14960, H.R.
15137, H.R. 15192, H.R. 15848, and H.R. 15847, 91st Cong. 414‒40 (1970) (statement of Rep. Ken
Hechler of West Virginia).
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by technology-specific emissions standards that would drive down pollution
more aggressively.57 Muskie seems to have understood NAAQS as providing
an answer to both challenges. By setting a national standard, it would, in effect,
create a universal right to clean air, not dependent on the conjunction of
pollution sources in any particular locality. As Muskie explained in discussing
“the philosophy of the bill,” the point was to establish a principle that “all
citizens have an inherent right to the enjoyment of pure and uncontaminated air
and water and soil.”58 The level of protection afforded by this statutory right,
the Senate Report on the CAA emphasized, should be set at a level rigorous
enough to protect even especially vulnerable populations, such as those
suffering from emphysema or asthma, and the aged or very young.59 Although
the guarantee of healthful air was, in form, a regulatory mandate rather than a
right, it was made individually enforceable by the Act’s citizen-suit provision,
which, the bill’s supporters argued, resolved questions about enforcement by
empowering individuals affected by NAAQS violations to backstop agency
enforcement with individual actions.60 A different approach, Muskie argued,
would be “Russian roulette . . . with the trapped inhabitants of urban
America.”61
Of course, one does not have to take such political talk at face value, but a
deliberately charitable interpretation in this case helps to reveal the lines of a
worldview in which the CAA, as written, was already an environmental justice
statute. Anti-pollution laws, in this view, formed part of a comprehensive
approach to regulating what John Kenneth Galbraith had influentially called
“the affluent society.”62 Muskie used the term in setting out the program of the
CAA on the Senate floor, calling it a response to “the wasteful practices of an
affluent society.”63 In this view, the anti-pollution statutes were part of a
comprehensive renovation of the human “total environment,” alongside other
programs of the Great Society and War on Poverty. The common goal was to
57. In his foreword to Vanishing Air, Nader wrote, “The national ethic against air pollution must
be translated into a policy of ‘maximum use of technology down to zero profits’ until corporations stop
poisoning their neighbors’ habitat.” ESPOSITO & SILVERMAN, supra note 49, at ix. Muskie quoted this
passage in his official reply to the Nader criticisms. See 116 CONG. REC. 15,609 (1970).
58. 116 CONG REC. 32,902‒03 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). In his own words in
introducing the bill, Muskie described its goal as being that “all Americans in all parts of the Nation
should have clean air to breathe . . . that will have no adverse effects on their health.” Id. at 32,901.
59. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 7, 10‒11 (1970).
60. Id. at 36‒39 (explaining that the objective character of the NAAQS standards would make
citizen suits tractable for courts, and thus enforce consistent policy across the country). Muskie made the
same point in a floor debate while answering a challenge to the citizen-suit provision. See 116 CONG.
REC. 32,902‒03, 32,926‒27 (arguing that the bounds of a citizen suit were made objective by the
NAAQS standards, and that such suits would form an essential complement to agency enforcement in
creating a consistent national policy). Strictly speaking, citizen suits do not directly enforce NAAQS,
but rather demand enforcement action against polluters in violation of emissions permits that are, in
turn, keyed to the NAAQS.
61. 116 CONG. REC. 32,906 (statement of Sen. Muskie).
62. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
63. 116 CONG. REC. 32,900 (statement of Sen. Muskie).
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overcome social and economic isolation, especially clusters of persistent
poverty, and build up institutions that promoted learning and development.64
Establishing individually enforceable national standards for healthful air and
water played a key part in this program, as did controlling toxins. But those
measures could rely on others in the larger program when it came to
distributing the hazards that would still have to be allocated, from hazardous
waste facilities to persistent air and water pollution. The basic insight of
environmental justice—that absent specific protections, these persistent
burdens will be distributed along familiar lines of race and poverty—is weighty
in proportion to the intensity of those other forms of inequality. Reformers in
1970 expected those forms of inequality to give way to a combination of
egalitarian macroeconomic tendencies and inclusive and redistributive policies.
Although it may seem clear in hindsight that Nixon-era retrenchment had
already begun as the major environmental laws were passed, Muskie instead
took the view of Joseph Califano, President Johnson’s principal aid for
domestic policy. Califano argued in 1968 that the Johnson years had “cleared
the liberal agenda”; that conservatives, too, were now interventionists and
redistributionists in matters ranging from affirmative action and day care to
proposals for a basic income; and that the important question was how to carry
forward, not just piecemeal legislation, but what Muskie called “a reshaping of
our basic political institutions and . . . a reshaping of our thinking about
them.”65 In this view, the challenge of the time was to follow the lead of
events, both macroeconomic and political, in the direction of greater economic
and social equality.
Soon the political turn against the regulatory and redistributionist state
would become more apparent. Moreover, at roughly the time the major
environmental laws were passing through Congress with huge majorities,
economic inequality began its forty-year increase.66 In their time, though, the

64. See supra text accompanying note 48 (discussing “The Great Society” and “war on poverty”
programs).
65. 114 CONG. REC. 11,158‒60 (1968) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (inserting into the record a
speech by Joseph A. Califano delivered before the Nieman Fellows of Harvard University on April 23,
1968). Muskie repeatedly sounded this note about the environmental statutes, describing them as
paradigm-shifting changes in the duties as well as the rights of citizenship. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC.
36,872, 36,874 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The whole intent of [the Clean Water Act] is to
make a national commitment, . . . ‘Can we afford clean water? . . . Can we afford life itself?’ . . . Those
questions were never asked as we destroyed the waters of our Nation, and they deserve no answers as
we finally move to restore and renew them. These questions answer themselves. And those who say that
raising the amounts of money called for in this legislation may require higher taxes, or . . . contribute to
inflation simply do not understand the language of this crisis.”); see also 116 CONG. REC. 42,392 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Muskie) (“There has to be a commitment to [clean air] by every citizen, not only with
respect to the activities of others, but with respect to each citizen himself . . . .”).
66. See PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 291 fig. 8.5 (showing income inequality in the United States
from 1910 to 2010 with a sharp increase beginning in the mid-to-late 1970s); id. at 348 fig. 10.5
(showing wealth inequality in the United States for a timeline spanning from 1810 to 2010).
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major environmental statutes incorporated their architects’ expectations that the
laws would operate within a general movement toward greater equality.
B. Disparate Impact and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies
Second, the period between the passage of many of the major
environmental statutes in 1970–77 and the rise of the environmental justice
movement in the 1980s coincided with the Supreme Court’s rejection of
disparate-impact claims under the Equal Protection Clause and adoption of the
requirement that equal-protection plaintiffs demonstrate “discriminatory
purpose” by an official actor.67 Several early environmental justice suits were
turned away by courts precisely for their failure to show discriminatory intent,
even in cases of dramatically disparate distribution of environmental harms.68
Thus, those who wrote the environmental laws of 1970–77 had some reason to
believe that, where the statutes failed to achieve a reasonably equitable
distribution of burdens, litigants could call on courts to review policies with
racially disparate effects.
The requirement to demonstrate discriminatory intent altered the remedial
landscape for plaintiffs whose disparate burdens arose from the interaction of
facially neutral statutes with background conditions of economic and racial
inequality. Even at the time of Washington v. Davis, which announced the
requirement of purposeful discrimination and declined to base a finding of such
discrimination solely on evidence of disparate impact, it was not clear that the
courts would give the doctrine the strict formulation that it later received.69 The
lead opinion by Justice White focused on the institutional particulars of the
District of Columbia police department, and Justice Stevens, concurring,
argued that “the common-law presumption” that actors are responsible for the
foreseeable effects of their actions should govern disparate-impact claims.70 It
was because of this doctrinal development that environmental justice plaintiffs
were thrown on the environmental statutes as their primary source of remedies,
and so were confronted with those statutes’ facial indifference to the economic
and racial distribution of whatever hazards they did not ban outright. It says
67. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979) (holding that where a law
has a foreseeable disparate impact, it must have been passed because of, not despite of, that impact, i.e.,
it must have been motivated by or aimed at the disparate impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976) (finding no equal protection claim from a showing of disparate racial impact absent evidence
of purposeful discrimination by an official actor).
68. See, e.g., R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that a
community organization failed to establish that placement of a landfill in a predominately black area of
the county resulted from intentional discrimination); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. MaconBibb Cty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 896 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Bean v. Sw.
Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 681 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986)
(same).
69. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246–48.
70. See id. (discussing the D.C. Police Department’s recruitment practices); id. at 252–69
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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something about how abruptly the world the environmental reformers took for
granted was stripped from them that a number of civil-rights lawyers continued
well into the 1980s to couch environmental justice suits as Equal Protection
claims based on disparate impact. While the growth of economic inequality
returned and political support for Great Society-style programs collapsed, the
constitutional means for addressing the predictable effects of persistent and
growing inequality and the disparate effects of facially neutral policies
disappeared from the United States Reports.
This intersection between the environmental and racial-justice areas, in the
domains of both law and movements, suggests a larger point about the
emergence of environmental justice. In 1970, the radical black scholar Nathan
Hare articulated the later-canonical arguments of environmental justice in a
polemical essay in The Black Scholar.71 Hare argued that “the reformist
solutions tendered by the current ecology movement” were “somewhat
ludicrous from the black perspective” but that nonetheless “[t]he emergence of
the concept of ecology in American life is potentially of momentous relevance
to the ultimate liberation of black people.”72 Hare argued that the key was to
understand that “ecology” for many black people meant a residential and
workplace environment with disproportionate concentrations of conventional
pollution, but also, and just as important, intolerable levels of crowding, noise,
vermin, exposure to workplace accidents, and risk of violent crime.73 While the
“white ecology” of “mainstream environmentalism” was indifferent to these
problems in Hare’s telling, a more thoroughgoing ecological analysis would
show that “[n]o solution to the ecology crisis can come without a fundamental
change in the economics of America particularly with reference to blacks,” and,
indeed, “[t]he real solution to the environmental crisis is the decolonization of
the black race.”74 I have not found evidence that Hare’s formulation reached
more mainstream and legally consequential debates. Nonetheless, Hare’s
argument is a reminder that the environmental justice movement arose in
conversation with an argument in the long black freedom struggle about what
kind of equality might suffice as redress for the situation of black Americans.
Five years before Hare wrote, Bayard Rustin, a close ally of Martin Luther
King, Jr. and an organizer of the 1963 March on Washington, had already
called the drive for formal equality of the desegregation period the “classical”
phase of the civil rights movement, a term historian Jacqueline Hall would

71.
72.
73.

Nathan Hare, Black Ecology, BLACK SCHOLAR, Apr. 1970, at 2.
Id. at 2, 7.
See id. at 4. Besides arguing for treating all of these as vectors of ecological harm, Hare
adapted conventional studies of urban poverty to an environmental vocabulary, quoting accounts of
malnutrition from the iconic proposal for a national basic income, Poverty Amid Plenty, and
characterizing these as a “form of pollution.” Id. at 6; see also THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON INCOME
MAINT. PROGRAMS, POVERTY AMID PLENTY: THE AMERICAN PARADOX 16–17 (1969).
74. Hare, supra note 71, at 2, 7, 8.
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adopt forty years later in writing of the “long” civil rights movement.75 Rustin
went on to argue that to succeed, the movement would have to move on to
economic reconstruction, from “equal opportunity” to substantive “equality.”76
The environmental justice movement carried Rustin’s case for economic
reconstruction into the domain of environmental law at a time when the
distance between formally equal treatment and substantive reconstruction was
growing anew.
C. Legal Liberalism and the Institutionalization of Environmental Law
Both the environmental statutes and the environmental movement that
took form in the 1970s and early 1980s bore the stamp of a conception of law’s
role in legal and social reform that was regnant among elite reformers in the
1960s and 1970s. Steven Teles has termed this view “legal liberalism” and
linked it with a more general view of the law’s role in a democratic society.77
Legal liberalism was defined by its emphasis on the use of litigation and
adjudication-like procedures to protect individuals against arbitrary
discrimination with respect to their basic interests—that is, to ensure the formal
preconditions of their full participation in political, economic, and social
institutions. It implied a central but also quite specifically delimited role for
legal advocacy, focused on securing formal rights and procedural attention for
those who lacked organized voice backed by money or institutional heft, such
as the disorganized poor and consumers.78
Legal liberalism took plausibility from the distributional optimism of the
mid-twentieth century: its procedural emphases made sense on the view that
formally equal and open economic participation overcame rather than

75. Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,
COMMENTARY, Feb. 1965, at 25. For the use of “classical,” see Hall, supra note 22, at 1251.
76. Rustin, supra note 75.
77. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 22‒57 (2008) (describing “the rise of the liberal legal network”). The term is
also associated with Laura Kalman’s The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism. Kalman uses the term to
refer to a series of scholarly and institutional developments in which legal scholars sought to justify,
preserve, and expand the reformist jurisprudence of the Warren Court (and to some extent the early
Burger Court, in cases such as Roe v. Wade). Laura Kalman’s THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 60–93 (1996). Teles refers to a different phenomenon—the central place that legal
institutions, practice, and concepts achieved in the institutional and intellectual life of center-left reform
movements between the late 1950s and the late 1970s, which he calls “the legalization of reform.”
TELES, supra note 77, at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. As I read it, this set of connections is only hinted at, not developed, in Teles’s account, which
contains a great deal of valuable institutional detail. I am building on his reconstruction of the view of
the legal profession that legal liberalism took to connect it with a larger idea of the legitimate forms of
state power, dissent, and reform that it seems to me to echo. This formulation owes to Katrina
Forrester’s manuscript-in-process on the history of post-World War II political and legal philosophy and
the interaction with the salient events and dramas of the period (unpublished, partial manuscript on file
with author).
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reinforced embedded inequality.79 But legal liberalism was by no means
determined by economic optimism alone. Rather, it formed a key part of what
is often termed the “consensus liberalism” of the Cold War period in U.S.
history.80 Procedural guarantees promised to bring neglected interests into
decision making within a pluralist democracy that discarded ambitious visions
of collective self-rule and also recast class conflict as interest-group politics.81
In light of its picture of politics as the rotation of groups in and out of transient
majorities, pluralist-democratic thought adopted a version of the concern with
overcoming exclusion that also preoccupied the thinking of the time on
economic policy. John Hart Ely’s conception of constitutional review as filling
persistent structural gaps in political decision makers’ consideration of the
interests of disadvantaged or disorganized groups represents the elevation of
legal liberalism to constitutional theory, explicitly portraying judges’ remit as
the procedural defense of those disadvantaged by an otherwise legitimate
democratic pluralism.82
The institutional trajectory of “mainstream environmentalism” in the early
and mid-1970s took much of its shape from the legal-liberal conception of
advocacy. These years shaped environmental politics for decades thereafter in
the litigation and elite advocacy that the environmental justice movement
critiqued. The key events in this history of influence were pivotal institutional
investments in nascent environmental groups by the Ford Foundation, which
had already been at the center of building up clinical programs in law schools
and developing pro bono expectations for the bar, two key sites of
implementation for the legal-liberal ideal of representation as advocacy.83 In
the early and mid-1970s, the Ford Foundation made major grants to EDF and

79. Teles does not make this argument, but David Grewal and I have, drawing on his version of
“legal liberalism,” in Inequality Rediscovered. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 21.
80. See, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 3–14 (1955) (arguing that because America
had never dealt with feudalism or needed to dismantle an old order, American political development has
occurred within the context of an enduring, underlying Lockean liberal consensus). Although Hartz is
often invoked as a consensus-school thinker, he is somewhat peculiar in that he took consensus as
historical fact and sought to understand it, not uncritically. This puts him in a rather different light from,
say, Daniel Boorstin, whose work is more emblematic of the political cast of the consensus school. See
generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953) (arguing that shared
commitments to individual liberty and economic freedom—not any more systematic political
philosophy—gave American politics its unique genius).
81. It was not quite as neat as this; Teles, for instance, observes signs of anxiety about riots and
social discontent in the motives of legal elites promoting legal liberalism. TELES, supra note 77, at 58‒
63.
82. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST 105‒34 (1980) (setting out a theory of
constitutional review as working procedurally to “[c]lear[] the [c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange” in
democracy).
83. See TELES, supra note 77, at 30‒52. As Teles details, the Ford Foundation made very
substantial early grants in indigent defense and poverty law more generally, coming in advance of and
helping to lay the ideological and institutional ground for publicly funded institutions that followed.
Ford also played a key role in supporting the development of clinical education in law schools.
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NRDC. Ford guidance helped to build up EDF from a grassroots coalition of
scientists, lawyers, and citizens on Long Island.84 It also effectively founded
NRDC by brokering the merger of a band of young, liberal, well-connected
Yale Law School graduates with a Republican director of old-line
conservationist impulses, the Simpson Thacher lawyer, John Adams.85 Ford
made some of its largest cumulative Resources and Environment grants of the
1970s to these groups: $3,635,000 to NRDC, $1,079,500 to EDF, $1,509,000 to
the Southern California Center for Law in the Public Interest, and $760,000 to
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, which later became Earthjustice.86 Ford’s
account of the reasons for these investments exemplifies the legal-liberal
conception of advocacy: “The Foundation has been assisting the environmental
law movement since 1970 in the belief that in a pluralistic society the views
and interests of all segments of opinion should have their day in court.”87 The
ideal was to bring all “views and interests” before an impartial decision maker,
not to engage in political contests to form views and challenge or reshape
interests.
The deliberately bipartisan NRDC answered, like EDF, to a litigation
review board carefully stocked with law-firm partners and sympathetic figures
from the business world.88 Although this has been interpreted as evidence of
elite control of these organizations, that view hardly comports with the
controversial and radical cases that the young lawyers brought, particularly in
their first decade.89 It is more convincing to see NRDC and EDF as instances
of a general pattern in the institutions of legal liberalism: collaboration between
senior professionals whose politics were often cast in a New Deal/Great
Society mold and young activists, frequently with moderate New Left
84. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 189‒93 (rev. ed. 2005) (recounting the story of EDF’s founding).
85. See id. at 193‒95 (recounting the story of NRDC’s founding).
86. FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1972); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 19, 21 (1973);
FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 32, 34 (1974); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 14, 16 (1975); FORD
FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1976); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1977); FORD FOUND.,
ANNUAL REPORT 12–13 (1978); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 44 (1979). Ford also made a
cumulative grant of $15.5 million from 1975 to 1978 to Resources for the Future, a research-oriented
organization that remains a key resource for informed policy making. See FORD FOUND., ANNUAL
REPORT 12 (1978). Also in the 1970s, Ford developed a proposal to fund Environmental Action, the
advocacy and organizing group proposed by the creators of the original 1970 Earth Day, but abandoned
it in late stages. GOTTLIEB, supra note 84, at 186‒88. The pattern of Ford’s field-shaping investments
was decisively in favor of expert knowledge and advocacy, not grassroots political organizing.
87. FORD FOUNDATION GRANTS IN RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 14 (emphasis added)
(1978).
88. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 85, at 202‒05 (discussing structure of Ford-funded environmental
groups).
89. For instance, NRDC forced EPA to develop water-quality criteria and effluent standards for
sixty-five toxic chemicals and families of chemicals. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2122 (D.D.C. June 9, 1976) (“Flannery decree”). EDF pressed EPA toward a more
stringent policy on vinyl chloride emissions. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1149
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (recounting history of vinyl chloride litigation in a subsequent action filed upon EPA’s
withdrawal of the rule that had resulted from earlier EDF litigation).
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sympathies, who saw in the law an institutional path to very basic changes,
including welfare rights, death-penalty and criminal-justice reform, and
revolutions in sex and gender.90 Legal liberalism did not necessarily narrow or
moderate the substantive scope of environmental politics. It did, however,
imply a persistent tilt toward professionalized and elite advocacy that was less
likely to engage ordinary people as active constituents than as donors or clients.
The legal-liberal model of reform also meant that legally oriented activism
followed the ideological peregrinations of the federal courts, not because the
advocates became personally more moderate in their goals (whether or not they
in fact did so), but because their strategy entailed that what was possible was a
function of the arguments that judges would embrace. An advocate who started
out with visions of enforcing a progressive conception of the public interest
through public-trust or substantive National Environmental Policy Act suits in a
green 1970s soon modified her expectations, much as reproductive-rights and
poverty lawyers did as the Burger Court and its successors took hold of legal
interpretation.91
The shaping influence of legal liberalism on environmental law also tilted
the definition of environmental problems toward professionals and established
groups. The Ford Foundation expressed confidence that its grantees’ carefully
calibrated litigation, in which clients were often well-established groups,
ensured responsiveness to what the foundation seems to have regarded as an
uncontroversial “public interest.” A 1976 internal report on the foundation’s
involvement in public-interest law posed the question, “Are there substantial
interests in the community that do not get represented adequately because of
the way in which public interest law firms tend to choose their clientele?” and
responded, “[M]ost of the time public interest law firms represent established
and well-informed groups or organizations. The environmental . . . cases are the
best examples of this.”92 This answer seems to have satisfied the report’s
authors that their model of advocacy was adequately representing relevant
environmental interests. Those who did not identify with well-established
advocacy organizations might not have agreed.
The architects of “mainstream environmentalism’s” flagship organizations
knew, or so they believed, which problems were “environmental issues” and
what interest the public had in those issues. This self-confidence was partly
owing to a view about the empirical character of the natural world. The
90.
91.

See TELES, supra note 77, at 46‒57.
See generally CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTYFIRST-CENTURY AMERICA (2017) (discussing the development and current state of abortion law in the
United States).
92. Sanford M. Jaffe, Public Interest Law—Five Years Later, 62 AM. B. ASS’N J. 982, 985
(1976). In 1962, the Ford Foundation focused on technocratic, democratic, and conservationist
programs, and oriented to the problems that would be the crucible of mainstream environmentalism.
From 1970 to 1975, the foundation took the new skepticism, radicalism, and resistance into the body of
these ideas, and saw public-interest law as tending to become governance. By 1978, there was somewhat
more awareness of deep pluralism.
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influential “climax” theory of ecology described ecosystems as tending toward
stable equilibriums with high levels of biological energy and diversity.93 This
in turn seemed to imply natural baselines of health and flourishing—the climax
condition—that policy makers could aim to respect.94 This self-confidence also
expressed the unchallenged dominance of a network of elite reformers who
shared a substantially overlapping set of ideas about “the environment” and the
public interest in it. Homogeneity among decision makers allowed their view of
the scope and valence of “environmental issues” to feel, so to speak, natural.
This invisible uniformity was a key support for the melding of traditional
environmentalism with legal liberalism, an institutional strategy that then
proceeded to reinforce the same uniformity.
D. Summary
The “mainstream environmentalism” that emerged in the 1970s was
shaped by the premises of the time. The anti-pollution statutes were, as the
environmental justice critique later emphasized, designed without attention to
the prospect of their benefits and regulated harms being channeled along lines
of economic inequality and persistent racial disadvantage. With economic
inequality seemingly in decline, explicit distributive concerns seemed
dispensable in writing environmental statutes. With other egalitarian policies in
place and expected to grow, and disparate-impact protection as a backstop, it
was easy for drafters to imagine that environmental statutes did not need to
incorporate protections against compounding inequality. Legal liberalism
helped to channel the enforcement of these statutes into elite and
professionalized institutions that gave less voice to alternative views of
environmental problems than they might otherwise have done. The historical
irony is that it was precisely at the watershed moment of environmental
legislation, 1970–77, that the anomalous period of widely shared growth was
coming to an end, succeeded by four decades of increasingly unequal
distribution of wealth and income, even as egalitarian political and doctrinal
trends receded. The consequences were severe for populations that entered the
1970s burdened by long histories of economic exclusion, and who now found
that formal inclusion did not bring the convergence of economic outcomes that
recent decades had encouraged optimistic forecasters to expect.
III. THE NEGLECTED LONG HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
In this Part, I excavate neglected historical strands of environmental
politics that are marked by the following: attention to economic distribution

93. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1,
8 (1996).
94. See id. at 3–24 (discussing stability-oriented conceptions of the natural world, their influence
and decline, and what succeeded them).

44.4 PURDY V2 FOR JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

836

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

4/3/18 1:07 PM

[Vol. 44:809

and power; an embrace of a broad definition of “environment” that includes
neighborhoods and workplaces; and, in some cases, a commitment to public
participation and mobilization. The environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s
was moving away from this dimension of its history and toward a narrower
conceptualization of the human stakes in the natural world. Recovering these
earlier strands contributes to the recognition and potential recovery of the long
environmental justice movement.
A. Environment and Political Economy in the Early Wilderness Movement
“Environment,” wrote Benton MacKaye in 1928, “is the influence upon
each inner mind of the thing shared by every inner mind . . . the filament which
binds our separate lives . . . the total life which every life must share.”95 What
MacKaye meant by “environment” was the braided product of human and
nonhuman systems. His paradigm of an environmental way of thinking was a
description of New York City as a nexus of many kinds of “flows”: the Hudson
River, the Atlantic tides, the weather-bearing wind out of the West, steel from
the Great Lakes, commodities from Europe and South America, and people
pulsing daily through the veins and arteries of the highways, subway, and
commuter rail.96 As humanity came to understand and appreciate that the
human environment was a skein of many systems, it faced what MacKaye
called “the wilderness of civilization.”97 He meant by “wilderness” something
newly encountered and not yet fully understood, something alien—despite
being a human creation—and full of potential for both knowledge and wonder.
In contemporaneous work, MacKaye contributed to making “wilderness”
a key word in the mainstream environmental lexicon of the mid- and later
twentieth century, and a key feature of the environmental agenda. MacKaye
was a founder in 1935 of the Wilderness Society, which very substantially
shaped the Wilderness Act of 1964, a statute that to date has preserved about
110 million acres of federal land from development, mechanical transportation,
and commercial activity.98 He is also commonly credited with the creation of
the Appalachian Trail, which he substantially designed and long championed.
At the risk of getting ahead of the story, MacKaye sits at the center of a
standard and somewhat skeptical view of the mainstream environmental
movement, one that environmental historian William Cronon famously set out
in his 1996 essay “The Trouble with Wilderness.”99 Cronon argued that
95. BENTON MACKAYE, THE NEW EXPLORATION: A PHILOSOPHY OF REGIONAL PLANNING 134
(1928). It was, he continued, “the least common denominator of our inner selves.” Id.
96. Id. at 5‒25.
97. Id. at 15.
98. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131‒1136
(2012)); Wilderness Act, WILDERNESS SOC’Y, http://wilderness.org/article/wilderness-act (last visited
Nov. 20, 2017).
99. William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, ENVTL.
HIST., Jan. 1996, at 7.
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modern environmentalism is the product of a fixation on the wild and pristine
that a relatively limited set of Romantic elites bequeathed to environmental
politics.100 The problem with this version of environmentalism, Cronon argued,
was that it overlooked and implicitly denigrated all the “fallen” places where
people actually live, take most of their pleasure, and do most of their harm—
the places where we live, play, work, and learn, as the environmental justice
movement put it.101 Cronon’s essay, which has become canonical in
environmental-studies circles, picks out strands in the history of environmental
ideas and politics, much before 1970, that anticipate and seem to help produce
the elite and culturally narrow version of mainstream environmentalism that the
environmental justice movement was critiquing as he wrote.
The real history of the wilderness movement undercuts the implication
that deep strands in environmental culture led ineluctably to its exclusion of
cities, power, inequality, and the other focal points of environmental justice.
MacKaye was a firm opponent of the binary between natural and artificial, and
also opposed pastoral idylls and anti-urban politics. Contrasting his view with
the anti-urban aesthetics and politics of Sierra Club founder John Muir,
MacKaye professed a defining interest in the quality of experience possible in
any setting: the opportunity to understand, admire, be moved by, and be at
home in a place.102 These criteria were, in his mind, equally applicable to
cities, regions, workplaces, and public recreational lands. The Appalachian
Trail, as he envisioned and argued for it, would be not a walk in the woods, but
a link among rural settlements of artists, artisans, and farmers, which would in
turn be linked by roads to larger towns and cities.103 The wild portions of the
trail, like designated wilderness areas on other public lands, would be dedicated
to a certain kind of aesthetic experience—the solitary encounter with
“untrammeled” nature.104 But the larger vision in which these wild places
played a central role was not a binary image of wild versus tame or human
versus natural, but a picture of a graduated series of engineered environments,
summing to a harmonious pattern.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 20.
See MACKAYE, supra note 95, at 215‒18.
See Benton MacKaye, An Appalachian Trail: A Project in Regional Planning, 9 J. AM. INST.
ARCHITECTS 325, 325‒330 (1921) (calling for the construction of the Appalachian Trail as a response to
the problems of how people were being affected by war, a full-throttle industrial society, and the
problem of society in which there was not enough work for everybody and yet use of leisure time was
unsatisfying). Although it is not the topic of this Article, pervasive involvement in the racist and nativist
strands of U.S. politics shaped many strands of the conservation movement in ways much less consonant
with modern environmental justice themes than the elements that I am exploring here. See DORCETA E.
TAYLOR, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2016) (highlighting the role of racism in conservation and the exclusion
of the voices of people of color from many of its early formulations); PURDY, AFTER NATURE, supra
note 3, at 153–61, 182–87 (discussing these issues).
104. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (defining wilderness as an area “untrammeled by man”).
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A New Dealer and a leader in the regional planning movement, MacKaye
regarded workers’ struggles as part of the larger campaign for a better human
environment. Writing of the mills near Pittsburgh, he reflected, “The workers
dwelling in these steel towns are, as is well known, in profound rebellion
against their condition in life.”105 Although all observers understood that
strikers “are fighting deliberately and definitely for higher pay and for longer
hours of leisure,” MacKaye argued that the strikes should also be seen as
aiming at “better living conditions,” not just “time,” but “space” in which to
develop and explore their own capacities.106 MacKaye’s environmental agenda
focused on reshaping space to enrich human life for members of all classes.
Robert Marshall was MacKaye’s Wilderness Society co-founder and the
president of the organization before he died suddenly at the age of thirty-eight.
Marshall was head of the Washington, D.C. branch of the American Civil
Liberties Union; Chief of Forestry for the Bureau of Indian Affairs under John
Collier, who implemented the partial restoration of tribal ownership and selfgovernment that is often termed the “Indian New Deal”; and, on his own
account, a socialist who looked forward to the replacement of “the profit
system” by administration and cooperation.107 He was an unrelenting advocate
for the aesthetic and cultural value of wilderness.108 But for him, as for
MacKaye, wilderness was only an element in a much broader program for the
public reshaping of the American landscape. He argued for nationalizing most
of the country’s commercial timber land (mainly by purchase and tax default),
both to impose what he regarded as rational management on a boom-and-bust
sector and to break what he called the “whip hand” of the timber industry over
both workers and regulators.109 He envisioned public forestry management as
part of a larger program of “rural reorganization” in which the federal
government would facilitate the movement of farmers and other rural residents
from regions that had been ecologically and economically damaged by
mismanagement of natural resources to more viable settlements “concentrated

105.
106.
107.

MACKAYE, supra note 95, at 143.
Id.
See JAMES M. GLOVER, A WILDERNESS ORIGINAL: THE LIFE OF BOB MARSHALL 149 (1986)
(quoting letters that Marshall wrote in the winter of 1932‒33, saying, “the only eventual solution will be
Socialism” and “I wish very sincerely that Socialism could be put into effect right away and the profit
system eliminated”). See, for example, id. at 185, for Marshall’s leadership in the ACLU, and id. at 157‒
66 for Marshall’s service under Collier.
108. See, e.g., Robert Marshall, The Problem of the Wilderness, 30 SCI. MONTHLY 141, 143–45
(1930) (arguing, rather eccentrically but with great intensity, that the pleasure wilderness devotees took
in the unspoiled outdoors was so qualitatively distinct from other satisfactions that it swamped the
utilitarian calculus that was otherwise appropriate in management decisions for public lands).
109. See ROBERT MARSHALL, THE PEOPLE’S FORESTS 89‒97 (1933) (attacking private ownership
and management of commercial forests); id. at 123‒40 (advocating public ownership for both
conservation and worker-welfare reasons); id. at 141‒58 (advocating public acquisition of forests by
transfer, as “the fact is inescapable that with the country functioning on a capitalistic basis it is out of the
question to consider confiscation as a feasible means of acquiring public forests”).
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in those areas best adapted for agriculture instead of [rural people] being
scattered all over the outdoors.”110
Both Marshall’s statist program for forest management and rural
reorganization and MacKaye’s agenda for comprehensive regional landscape
planning make clear that the wilderness movement was conceived as part of a
much larger reconstruction of American landscapes, residential patterns,
resource use, and the boundaries between state and market. That reconstructive
program did not, to be sure, present an environmental justice program adequate
to all of the concerns that actuated the later environmental justice movement.
Most significantly, like much Progressive and New Deal thinking and practice,
it reflected reformers’ capitulation, or commitment, to white supremacy.
Although the figures under discussion here did not share the eugenicist views
of Forest Service leader and conservation theorist Gifford Pinchot or the
obsessive racism of the influential preservationist Madison Grant, they did not
engage or reflect on the African American freedom struggle.111 Wilderness
Society figures tended, moreover, to favor expert administration over popular
participation, anticipating the professional and expert advocacy of later
environmentalism.112 Advocates such as MacKaye and Marshall were,
nonetheless, keenly interested in the broad shape of American political
economy, the distributive contests over economic and political power that they
saw in the fields of both politics and labor, and the qualitative shape that law
making gave to the places where people live, work, play, and learn. They were,
in those respects, members of a long environmental justice movement.
B. The Industrial Hygiene Roots of Pollution Politics
The publication in 1942 of Wilhelm Hueper’s Occupational Tumors and
Allied Diseases presented “the first major survey of the international literature
on occupational causes of cancer and a hard-hitting assessment of the
proliferation of hazards associated with new synthetic chemicals in the
workplace.”113 Hueper’s work consolidated a professional, lab-based version of
the “industrial hygiene” movements of previous decades.114 When Hueper
argued that “the new artificial environment” of industrial chemicals created a
new front in the imperative for government to secure “[t]he fundamental
requirements for a healthful living, not merely for a small, select, and socially
privileged group, but for the entirety of its citizens . . . by suitable laws
adequately enforced,” he was working in a decades-long tradition of reformist
110. Id. at 165‒70. Marshall wrote in the same vein, “Many entire towns and even counties should
be abandoned to the forests.” Id. at 166.
111. See PURDY, supra note 3, at 180–227 (discussing eugenicist and racist strains in protoenvironmental politics and the attitudes and effects of the wilderness movement).
112. See id.
113. William C. Boyd, Genealogies of Risk: Searching for Safety, 1930s‒1970s, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q.
895, 923 (2012).
114. See id.
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public-health research, but also confirming its turn from fieldwork to lab work,
from narrative to risk measurement.115 The previous generation of this work
had been defined by the pioneering industrial-health researcher (and the first
woman on the Harvard faculty) Alice Hamilton, who studied the health of
factory workers intensively between 1908 (her appointment to the Illinois
Commission on Occupational Diseases) and 1935 (her retirement from
Harvard), including major investigations of the health effects of lead and
phosphorous.116 Hamilton had previously studied the epidemiology of typhoid
in neighborhoods surrounding Chicago’s Progressive enclave, Hull House,
where she was a resident, and her industrial work was an application of that
style of fieldwork to the factory.
A sympathetic observer of the Lawrence, Massachusetts textile strike of
1931–32, Hamilton regarded the political power of manufacturers as a key
impediment to reforming industrial conditions, and unions as playing an
essential role in bringing about better conditions.117 In her support for
organized labor as a necessary part of the governance of industrial conditions,
Hamilton reflected not just the pitched conflicts over union organizing in the
early decades of the twentieth century, but the more specific engagement of
unions in workplace health. Between 1921 and 1928, the Workers’ Health
Bureau of America, which began as a project of the labor and public-health
reformers Grace Burnham and Harriet Silverman, established a beachhead as a
labor-based institution for research and advocacy on industrial health.118 With
an independent relationship with union locals, the Bureau by 1927 received
dues from 190 member locals in 24 states and collaborated with leading publichealth researchers.119 Burnham insisted on setting research agendas “from the

115. Id. at 924 (quoting WILHELM C. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL TUMORS AND ALLIED DISEASES 3‒
5, 848 (1942)).
116. See ALICE HAMILTON, EXPLORING THE DANGEROUS TRADES: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
ALICE HAMILTON, M.D. 114–26 (OEM Press Edition 1995) (1943) (recounting work on phosphorous
and lead exposure); id. at 138–60 (detailing research into lead, silica, and solvent exposure).
117. See id. at 357–58 (noting the “industrial feudalism” of the Lawrence mills, in which low
wages combined with denial of “self-respect and a sense of human dignity” to inspire conflict); id. at 12
(“[T]he National Association of Manufacturers has fought the passage of occupational-disease
compensation as it has fought laws against child labor, laws establishing a minimum wage for women
and a maximum working day.”); id. at 6, 13 (contrasting the “hot, dirty, and dangerous work . . . [and]
contempt from more fortunate Americans” that plagued the unorganized workers whom she observed at
the beginning of her career with structured negotiation among trade unions, industry representatives, and
experts in England). Boyd claims that Hamilton saw responsibility for factory conditions as residing
mostly with supervisors, and argues that this represents a pre-New Deal view of the limits of the
regulatory state. See Boyd, supra note 113, at 924 n.112. This claim strikes me as exaggerating the
contrast between Hamilton and later reformers, although it is true that in (one version of) classic
Progressive style, she had many warm words for individual managers who took responsibility for
factory conditions.
118. See David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Safety and Health as a Class Issue: The Workers’
Health Bureau of America during the 1920s, in DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS’ SAFETY AND HEALTH IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53, 53–64 (David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1989).
119. See id. at 60.
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standpoint of the worker,” the “individual . . . caught and bound fast in the
great web of machine industry as the fly is caught in the thousand-strand web
of the spider.”120 The roots of industrial toxicology were thus thoroughly
enmeshed with movements for reform and efforts to build both workers’ power
and systems of industrial governance in the early part of the twentieth century.
Their concern was the democratic and humanitarian management of the
“artificial environment” that the industrial economy produced.
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, an eloquent brief against reckless pesticide
use, builds on Hueper’s work in its treatment of contaminated drinking water,
DDT, cancer in wild fish, and the imperative of eliminating carcinogenic agents
from the environment as a public-health prophylactic, among other topics.121
Carson, however, put the tradition of industrial toxicology to a new use. Like
the larger environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, to which she
importantly contributed, Carson expanded the scope of environmental
questions by thematizing the human relationship to the natural world as a
whole, rather than specific places and resources. She narrowed environmental
discourse by treating the social world as populated by an undifferentiated
humanity, whose emblematic middle-class members lived almost exclusively in
small towns and suburbs. The rhetorical switch uprooted the tradition of
industrial toxicology from its constitutive engagement in social and economic
reform.
C. The Great Forgetting: The Narrowing Agenda of the 1950s and 1960s
As we have seen, the political program of wilderness preservation began
as part of a New Deal vision of public ownership, planning for quality of life,
and, above all, an integration among different kinds of human environments,
with wilderness as just one type of managed environment, prized for offering
solitude and sustained encounters with the nonhuman world. This solitude was
figured as one note in a larger legal composition of sociability, and as a
political goal connected with workers’ struggles for more livable workplaces
and communities.
By the middle of the 1950s, the vision had narrowed. The Wilderness
Society formed a strategic alliance with the Sierra Club, whose longtime head,
David Brower, had recently won an attention-getting battle to stop a dam that
would have flooded Dinosaur Monument on the Utah-Colorado line, and was
looking for a new flagship issue. Exploring whether wilderness might fill the
role, he offered a back-page essay in the influential Sierra Bulletin to Howard
Zahniser, the Wilderness Society’s longtime secretary and the editor of its
journal, Living Wilderness. In that essay, Zahniser argued that time spent in the
120. Id. at 54‒55 (quoting GRACE M. BURNHAM, A HEALTH PROGRAM FOR ORGANIZED LABOR
(1921)).
121. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 18, 50, 221–25, 235, 239, 240–43 (First Mariner Books
2002) (1962).
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wilderness could induce a special kind of ecological and ethical insight, arising
from “areas of the earth within which we stand without our mechanisms that
make us immediate masters over our environment—areas of wild nature in
which we sense ourselves to be, what in fact I believe we are, dependent
members of an interdependent community of living creatures that together
derive their existence from the sun.”122 For the rest of its successful eight-year
push for passage of the Wilderness Act (which became law in 1964), the
Wilderness Society, its congressional supporters, and its movement allies
would focus on this line of argument: that wilderness offered unique spiritual
insight and renewal, thus serving as a natural cathedral for the weekend
pilgrim. In a speech that the Wilderness Act’s Senate sponsor, Hubert
Humphrey, entered into the Congressional Record in 1961 as an account of the
philosophy of the legislation, Zahniser again argued that, in wilderness,
Americans were “keeping ourselves in touch with true reality” and “our
primeval origin, our natural home” while also finding “relief from the stress
and strain of our civilized living.”123 This was precisely the line of argument
that the Sierra Club had long used in advocating for preservation of scenic and
recreational land: a combination of aesthetic uplift, ethical instruction, and
middle-class vacation.124
Brower was at this time building the Sierra Club’s political strategy
around the marketing of scenic lands in the form of sumptuous and expensive
coffee-table books, one of which, This Is Dinosaur, had been the central
document in the Club’s successful defense of Dinosaur Monument.125 The
Sierra Club had long been apolitical outside of its advocacy for preserving
public lands; the Sierra Club Bulletin managed to avoid discussion of World
War I other than an occasional note from a soldier recalling a favorite hike at
home, and Muir avoided the Civil War and said nothing about the racial, labor,
or other conflicts of a long life lived in interesting times.126 The Wilderness
Society, in its alliance with the Sierra Club, perfected its own version of singleissue advocacy, in which wilderness was the singular goal, its values readily
translatable to a professional’s vacation schedule.
122. Howard Zahniser, “What’s Behind the Wilderness Idea?”, SIERRA CLUB BULLETIN, Jan.
1956, at 32, 32.
123. 107 CONG. REC. 18,356 (1961).
124. For instance, John Muir, the charismatic devotee of the outdoors who founded the Sierra Club
in 1892 and was its public face until his death in 1914, had promised his readers that, thanks to the Great
Northern Railroad’s lines from San Francisco to the Sierras, they could step off a train platform and “in
a few minutes [they would] find [them]self in the midst of . . . the best care-killing scenery on the
continent.” JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 17 (1901).
125. See generally JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID (1971) (offering a wry
portrait of Brower’s political strategy as a merchant of aesthetics).
126. I once went through all Sierra Club Bulletin issues from the relatively short period of U.S.
involvement in World War I, wondering whether Muir’s high-country Transcendentalism had preserved
any of its New England antecedents’ skepticism of war and nationalism, and found no evidence that it
had. See generally DONALD WORSTER, A PASSION FOR NATURE: THE LIFE OF JOHN MUIR (2008)
(discussing Muir’s own apolitical attitudes).
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Meanwhile, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was published in 1962.
Carson’s book, which gets well-deserved credit for formulating the sense of
threat that informed so much of environmental politics in the ensuing fifteen
years, followed on the public-minded studies of industrial toxins that Alice
Hamilton and others had pioneered. And Carson, whose writing was a form of
activism and who was pilloried by the chemical industry for her efforts, did
note in her first chapter that she wrote in “an era dominated by industry, in
which the right to make a dollar at whatever cost is seldom challenged.”127 On
the whole, however, Carson crafted an environmental rhetoric that avoided the
political and economic engagement of earlier generations and instead centered
its attention on threats to small-town and suburban domesticity on the one hand
and, on the other, threats to a natural world that Carson portrayed as a treasuretrove of long-established harmonies among species and their settings. Carson
opened Silent Spring with an image of “a town in the heart of America where
all life seemed to live in harmony with its surroundings,” which was
mysteriously visited by “a strange blight” and “a shadow of death.”128 She
described an undisturbed world in which “life reached a state of adjustment and
balance with its surroundings,” and contrasted it with the world after the
application of pesticides, where “the whole closely knit fabric of life has been
ripped apart.”129
I offer these two developments, in the wilderness movement and the
tradition of public-minded toxicology, as emblematic of a change in which
environmental themes that earlier in the twentieth century seemed closely tied
with working conditions, economic power, and the larger question of how to
shape American life were adjusted to fit the constraints of mid-twentiethcentury consensus politics. Within those constraints, the basic questions about
how Americans were to live seemed settled; they would live in suburbs,
modeled on idyllic small towns, separated from their workplaces spatially but
also by the distance between an ethics of commerce and an ethics of
domesticity.130 Carson did not portray these spheres as involved in disputes
either over the rules that should prevail within them or over their boundaries
and relations with one another—the kinds of disputes that feminism, labor
politics, and the civil rights movement had launched and would soon amplify.
The only break in the harmony came, on this account, from failing to respect
the perennial balance of nature.

127.
128.
129.
130.

CARSON, supra note 121, at 13.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 6, 67.
See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (2001) (treating critically the
suburban family structure and form of life); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (describing the centrality of the suburb to American
life in the twentieth century); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY
BESIEGED (1977) (analyzing the centrality of the middle-class family structure to post-World War II
American life).
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Carson, to repeat, was a courageous activist and, it bears mentioning, a
feminist who faced misogynistic attacks from the industries that her writing
threatened. No part of this argument is directed personally at her or, for that
matter, at the strategists of the Wilderness Society. The point is rather that the
successes for which we remember them are symptomatic of the scope of
political economy and political imagination in their time. The logic of the
ecological threat that they identified, which soon became a general formula in
environmental mobilization and legislation, was simultaneously that everything
must change, in the form of collective self-restraint to respect and restore
natural harmonies; and that nothing in particular must change, that is, the
environmental crisis was not linked to calls for other changes in the legal or
social order. This environmentalism was a defense of society, imagined as a
whole, against an exogenous ecological crisis. That formula led Time and
President Nixon, among others, to identify the environment as a unifying issue
for the 1970s, in explicit contrast to conflicts over race.131
The availability of this environmentalist formula for national unification in
the face of other divisive political and social conflicts was what, in turn,
suggested to left-wing critics that it was a covert form of pastoral conservatism
in radical costume.132 The same appeal to a certain blend of urgency and
complacency, the complacency residing in a disinclination to ask which
America was to be saved, and for whom, would later draw the attention of the
environmental justice movement. But this complacency was a recent
development in the mainstream environmentalism of the 1960s and very early
1970s, not a perennial feature of environmental politics. Nor, as we shall see in
the next Part, was it ever the whole story.
IV. WHICH MOVEMENT? WHOSE ENVIRONMENT? OPEN QUESTIONS, 1968–81
Despite the narrowing just described, there were active strands of
environmental politics in the late 1960s and early-to-mid-1970s that continued
to represent a broad, justice-oriented political economy, which might have
contributed to the institutionalization of a different version of
environmentalism. Key examples here are two very different labor institutions,
the insurgent Miners for Democracy (MFD) and the United Auto Workers
(UAW), the established union that for decades represented “the left wing of the

131. See, e.g., President Richard M. Nixon, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 22, 1970) (arguing that answering the environmental crisis could unite Americans otherwise
divided by political “part[ies]” and “factions”); Issue of the Year: The Environment, TIME, Jan. 4, 1971,
at 21 (noting that the environmental crisis is a “problem which American skills . . . might actually solve,
unlike the immensely more elusive problems of race prejudice or the war in Viet Nam”).
132. See, e.g., John H. Schaar & Sheldon S. Wolin, Where We Are Now, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(May 7, 1970), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1970/05/07/where-we-are-now/ (describing the
environment as “the kind of issue which . . . permits a full catharsis of moral indignation without
seriously altering the structure of power or the logic of the system”).
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possible.”133 A combination of contingent events and structural trends took
these movements off the table as defining allies for an environmental law
community that was, in the same years, taking the institutional form that the
environmental justice movement soon arose to criticize.
A. Miners for Democracy: An Appalachian Labor Environmentalism?
MFD was at once a throwback to the self-organized and confrontational
labor mobilization of the pre-National Labor Relations Act era and a social
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In its most effective period, MFD
toppled the longstanding leadership of the United Mineworkers of America
(UMWA) and brought rank-and-file miners into active union governance in a
way that the coalfields, and indeed most of American labor, had not seen for
decades.134 Inspired in part by the 1969 murder of Joseph “Jock” Yablonski, an
anti-establishment candidate for the presidency of the UMWA, the MFD is best
remembered as an anti-corruption movement for clean union elections and
accountable leadership.135 It is also widely recognized that the MFD drew
power from a surge of coalfield discontent around workplace safety and health.
On November 20, 1968, an explosion of methane and coal dust in the Consol
No. 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia killed seventy-eight miners, and the
response of the UMWA’s leadership was widely perceived as tepid and
accommodating toward the coal companies.136 In the next year, miners
mobilized as never before around another workplace safety issue:
pneumoconiosis, or “black lung,” the destruction of lung tissue by exposure to
fine coal dust.137 This endemic and often deadly industrial disease had grown
more widespread as mechanized mining increased exposure to fine dust in the
mines, and miners and their families grew increasingly aware of the etiology of
the deadly disorder.138 More than 40,000 miners walked off the job in strikes in
133. The phrase comes from the socialist writer Michael Harrington. See Maurice Isserman,
Michael Harrington (1928–1989): Socialist Intellectual, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. LABOR AND
WORKING-CLASS HISTORY: VOLUME 2, at 569 (Eric Arnesen ed., 2007).
134. See JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING
CLASS 23–38 (2010) (detailing the rise and fall of the MFD). Interestingly, Cowie, who shares some
version of my interest in identifying the unrealized potential of insurgent movements such as the MFD,
seems to be entirely unaware of the environmental connection, and identifies environmentalism with the
well-educated, high-minded Morris Udall wing of U.S. politics. See id. at 263. A somewhat reflexive
identification of environmentalism with elite aesthetic and cultural fixations seems, indeed, somewhat
typical of those who identify with the defeated left of radical labor and/or the radical civil-rights
movement. See, e.g., Alex Gourevitch, Two Hurricanes, JACOBIN (Aug. 9, 2012), https://jacobin
mag.com/2012/10/two-hurricanes-2/; Alex Gourevitch, Environmentalism—Long Live the Politics of
Fear, 22 PUB. CULTURE 411, 420–24 (2010); Alex Gourevitch et al., Forum: War on Global
Warming/War on Terror, N+1 (Winter 2008), https://nplusonemag.com/issue-6/politics/forum-war-onglobal-warming-war-on-terror/.
135. See COWIE, supra note 134, at 33–38.
136. See id. at 30–31.
137. See id. at 31–32.
138. See id. at 31. Cowie refers to company doctors who attributed to heart failure deaths caused
by the lungs’ inability to transmit oxygen to the blood, as well as oral traditions of miners being
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West Virginia in 1969, in coordination with the Black Lung Association, a
grassroots advocacy group of miners, their families, and doctors.139 The
strikers demanded a comprehensive, adequately funded system of health
benefits for mining retirees, especially victims of black lung. At one point, 95
percent of the state’s miners walked off the job for 23 days, substantially
shutting down the region’s coal industry.140
What is less well recognized is that the MFD’s commitment to workplace
safety was part of a larger conception of environmental health and justice.
Yablonksi’s campaign for the UMWA presidency included opposition to strip
mining, the predecessor to today’s mountaintop removal, already recognized as
an environmental burden concentrated in poor parts of Appalachia. Yablonski’s
successor, Arnold Miller, continued the opposition to strip mining in his
successful 1972 campaign as MFD’s candidate for the presidency of the
UMWA.141 Environmental ideas had been disseminated through the UMWA
Journal, originally in opportunistic opposition to atomic power, but in a way
that seems to have been genuinely taken up in both the insurgents’ leadership
and their rank and file. In 1972, a miner reflected about strip mining and the
acid drainage associated with destructive mining techniques and inadequate
reclamation:
The people in the valleys are liable to get washed out one of these days
with floods and slides. . . . Look at the creek in front of my house. You
can’t even find a minnow in there, with all that silt, mud, and acid in the
water. Even a mule couldn’t drink that water! After the big companies
finish here, a man might as well pack up and leave! The water will be all
dried up. The timber will be all cut off. . . . I think the people ought to have
something to say about where our mountain resources go. We need better
schools and better roads in Letcher County. We need parks. But the big
money men own everything and ship it out.142
Declaring his candidacy, Yablonski proposed to expand the frame of
occupational health to one of community and landscape health: “What good is a
union that reduces coal dust in the mines only to have miners and their families
breathe pollutants in the air, drink pollutants in the water, and eat contaminated
commodities?”143 Rachel Carson might have asked the same question; what is
remarkable is to find it here. The appeal to environmentalism as an integral part

officially reassured that coal dust was good for health. He quotes a miner from Harlan County,
Kentucky, as recalling, “You was taught, and I believed it, that coal dust was good for you. I’d actually
feel proud when I could cough up a mouthful of that black stuff and spit it out.” Id.
139. See id. at 32.
140. See id. (calling this action “the largest strike for an occupational health issue in American
history”).
141. See Paul J. Nyden, Miners for Democracy: Struggle in the Coal Fields 884 (1974)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author).
142. Id. at 751 (quoting Bernie Johnson, a thirty-seven-year-old miner from Letcher County).
143. Trish Kahle, The Graveyard Shift: Mining Democracy in an Age of Energy Crisis, 1963‒73,
at 34 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author).
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of miners’ struggles over workplace safety and political power was later
elaborated in the MFD’s 1972 platform, whose two leading planks were mine
safety and the coalfield environment.144 The MFD platform advocated a
national ban on strip mining and proposed that both the anti-stripping position
and the priority of miners’ workplace safety should be directly enforced
through work stoppages.145 This was a double radicalism, both substantive and
procedural. Substantively, it tied workplace safety to environmental
responsibility; procedurally, it cast organized workers as the enforcers of
industry-level principles that they had themselves formulated. If coal could not
be mined safely and without lasting environmental damage, the miners argued,
it should not be mined at all and they should refuse to mine it. West Virginia
Representative Ken Hechler, a voice for vulnerable regions in the CAA debate,
called the MFD’s platform “a veritable Magna Carta for the coal miners of
America.”146
B. Allies: The Nader Movement and the United Auto Workers
The MFD attracted the attention of progressive activists who hoped to
build cross-class and interracial alliances. Angela Davis spoke out in support of
the MFD during a speech at West Virginia University, and Ralph Nader argued
that the miners’ broad effort to build a more democratic union was the only
way to achieve more specific goals such as treating and preventing black
lung.147 Defenders of the traditional UMWA leadership, in turn, pilloried the
MFD for Nader’s support.148 Indeed, Nader’s “raiders,” young public-interest
researchers who sought to lay the informational groundwork for community
organizing and democratic reform, understood environmental questions much
as the MFD did. In a series of “Nader Reports,” they analyzed environmental
problems as the joint products of corporate power, workers’ economic
dependence, and political inequality, which only a deepened democracy could
adequately address. As the young James Fallows wrote in a 1971 Nader report
on pulp and paper mills outside Savannah, Georgia, “water pollution and ‘the
environmental crisis’ had become . . . bland and shopworn topics,” but the
“raiders” wanted to go further and trace the entire complex of problems to
“[t]he same economic and political arrangements that have ruined the river.”149
The report was careful to note that the burden of mill pollution in the Savannah

144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 39 (interpreting the MFD’s “Miners’ Bill of Rights,” as the platform was titled).
See id. at 41.
Id. at 34.
See Nyden, supra note 141, at 577–78 (on Davis); Cowie, supra note 134, at 31 (quoting

Nader).
148. See Nyden, supra note 141, at 509–10.
149. JAMES M. FALLOWS, THE WATER LORDS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON
INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN SAVANNAH, GEORGIA xix (1971).
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area fell heavily on the poorest neighborhoods.150 Three years later, a Nader
report on the same industry’s air and water pollution in Maine went further in
integrating environmental diagnosis with political economy, devoting chapters
to industry concentration, political influence, and labor contracts.151 In fact,
The Paper Plantation was not so much an environmental report as a synthetic
account of the political economy of Maine, with the state’s ecological problems
diagnosed as symptoms of a highly inequitable distribution of power.
In the early 1970s there were also sources of institutional support for
organizing along these lines. The UAW, under that union’s longtime leader
Walter Reuther, contributed money and support to the first Earth Day in 1970,
and in 1972 argued that, “The chief victims of pollution are the urban poor,
Blacks and workers who cannot escape their environment. Unless we join
together now to stop those who pollute for profit, our cities will become ugly
cesspools of poisonous pollutants.”152 Reuther’s UAW was long associated
with “the left wing of the possible” in post-World War II American politics.
Although its 1950 “Treaty of Detroit” with the auto companies exemplified the
mid-century American bargain by which unions guaranteed industrial peace
and gave up say over enterprise management, in return for generous benefits
and guaranteed wage increases, the UAW was also a leading American
practitioner of “social unionism,” pressing for generous social provision,
desegregation, and other progressive goals beyond its own workplaces.153 In
1970, the year that he died in a plane crash, Reuther distributed an
environmental questionnaire to union members to prepare the UAW’s
executive board to consider making “the problem of pollution . . . a matter for
collective bargaining in the 1970 negotiations” with General Motors.154 In one
of his last official addresses, Reuther offered his own view of the question:
“[T]he environmental crisis has reached such catastrophic proportions that . . .
the labor movement is now obligated to raise this question at the bargaining
table in any industry that is in a measurable way contributing to man’s
deteriorating living environment.”155 This was less than two years before UAW
workers revived disputes over enterprise management in a strike at the
Chevrolet Vega plant in Lordstown, Ohio, where 97 percent of members voted

150. Id. at 245 (“All five of Savannah’s housing projects are located in areas where air pollution is
unusually high. As with so many other issues, the poor suffer most and . . . can do least about it.”); see
also id. at 166‒70 (examining the extent of poverty in a larger region dominated by pulp-and-paper
production).
151. WILLIAM C. OSBORN, THE PAPER PLANTATION: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON
THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY IN MAINE 129–258 (1974).
152. Andrew D. Van Alstyne, The United Auto Workers and the Emergence of Labor
Environmentalism, 18 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 613, 622 (2015) (quoting UAW vice president and department
head Olga Madar).
153. See COWIE, supra note 134, at 43 (noting that, under Reuther, the UAW failed to practice at
home what it urged in policy, tolerating effective segregation and racism in the factory).
154. Van Alstyne, supra note 152, at 621.
155. Id. at 620‒21.
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to walk off the job to protest assembly speed and hyper-Taylorist task
fragmentation. That is to say, the relatively left-leaning UAW and the insurgent
MFD were both willing to revisit the terms of the “Treaty of Detroit” and put
enterprise management and society-wide economic policy back on the
bargaining table, precisely at the moment when a class-and-labor version of
environmentalism seemed to be taking form.156
This moment was so different from what followed that recovering a sense
of its potential can be difficult. By 1974, the MFD was finished as a vital
organization, having elected a charismatic UMWA head, Arnold Miller, whose
presidency was soon undermined by opposition from old-line union operatives
and, at least as much, his own emerging paranoia and isolation.157 In 1977, not
quite seven years after Reuther’s death, the UAW opposed amendments to
strengthen the CAA.158 However, the MFD’s insurgency, the Nader-led
activists, and the UAW’s activity from the mid-1960s (when it began
cooperating with the Sierra Club on water-quality issues) constitute evidence
that versions of environmental politics existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s
other than those institutionalized in the mainstream environmental groups with
the guidance and assistance of the Ford Foundation. These and other
movements and institutions suggest that there was potential for an
environmentalism that would have been intensely concerned with the
distribution of environmental burdens among communities and regions and
with economic and political power. This alternative environmentalism would
have taken working, nonwhite, and poor people as among its natural
constituencies and concerned itself centrally with the conditions of labor and
workplace hazards. Although some work along these lines has always been part
of mainstream environmental advocacy, these themes were not central to the
environmentalism that emerged from the struggles of the 1970s.
C. Institutional Agenda Consolidation in the Early 1980s
In 1985, a coalition of ten influential environmental groups marked four
years of close collaboration on priorities and strategy with the publication of An
Environmental Agenda for the Future.159 This small book devoted many of its
pages to woods-and-waters issues, characteristic 1980s worries about nuclear
156. Trish Kahle argues that rank-and-file MFD members and certain union locals were engaged in
arguments about the role that coal should play in the national energy economy. She argues that their
change in self-identification from “coal” to “energy workers” both engaged the miners in a vision of
energy policy as a relatively plastic field in which there were many potentially democratic choices to be
made and presented an opportunity for them to think about the comparative environmental effects of
competing modes of fuel extraction and energy production. See Kahle, supra note 143, at 10–12.
157. See COWIE, supra note 134, at 35–38, 254–56.
158. See Van Alstyne, supra note 152, at 623.
159. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 16, at 1–23. Participants included Natural Resources Defense
Council, Environmental Policy Institute, National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund,
The Izaak Walton League of America, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, National Parks and
Conservation Association, The Wilderness Society, and Friends of the Earth. Id.
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waste disposal and nuclear conflict, and the effect of pollution on public health
in general.160 It paid no real attention, however, to the distribution of
environmental burdens along lines of race or class (except for a brief, favorable
reference to fresh-air-fund camps for city youth), let alone to the systemic
issues of economic structure and political power that had preoccupied the MFD
and the Nader groups.161 An Environmental Agenda, then, represented the
consolidation of the environmental movement into a particular version of itself:
white, upper-middle class, and concerned with a set of issues that effectively
integrated the post-1970 pollution laws (the special concern of NRDC and
EDF) with the older agendas of public-lands preservation (The Wilderness
Society, the National Parks and Conservation Association) and biodiversity
maintenance—at least for those aspects of biodiversity with recreational and
aesthetic benefits (National Audubon Society, the Izaak Walton League of
America). Prominently omitted were the concerns with working conditions,
economic power, political accountability, and neighborhood health that had
been important to the more radical strands of environmental politics in the
1960s and 1970s. Absent, too, were institutional bearers of those radical
strands: labor, Naderite research-and-organizing groups, and the grassroots
outfits that were already (or still) fighting toxic-waste, garbage disposal, and
mining battles across the country.
For example, surface mining continued after the MFD disputes, mostly
outside the major environmental groups’ priorities.162 The Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, a legislative compromise between the
coal industry and surface-mining abolitionists, required that mining sites be
restored to their “approximate original contour[s].”163 The CWA’s restrictions
on the discharge of pollutants into waterways also offered a potential limit on
the practice of depositing mountaintop removal mining rubble, or
“overburden,” into nearby valleys, burying headwater streams in as much as six
hundred feet of broken rock.164 Nonetheless, state regulators issued permits
160.
161.

See id.
See id. It is also notable, that in a favorable discussion of birth-control policies, the report did
not acknowledge the political ambivalence around this discourse that arises from the long history of
coerced or semi-coerced sterilization of poor women and women of color, or the broader tendency in
this discourse to portray the poor and dark in terms of Gothic fecundity and crowding, as Paul Ehrlich
had done in The Population Bomb. PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 1–2 (1968). For an
essential discussion of these themes, see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY:
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997). For the famous passage on the
“population explosion,” see EHRLICH, supra, at 1.
162. Cf. MARK SQUILLACE, THE STRIP MINING HANDBOOK: A COALFIELD CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO
USING THE LAW TO FIGHT BACK AGAINST THE RAVAGES OF STRIP MINING AND UNDERGROUND
MINING 5–15 (1990).
163. Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2012).
164. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C § 1311(a) (2012) (“[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful.”); Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc., v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d
927, 931 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (holding that this prohibition on water pollution bars discharge of
overburden into mountain streams), vacated 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (reversing and vacating the
district court decision).
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authorizing the overburden burial of streams totaling as much as two thousand
miles in length.165 Yet, surface mining was not really on the agenda of the
national environmental groups until around 2000; it fell to investigative
journalists and local advocacy groups to monitor state permitting practices and
eventually bring the suits that called mountaintop removal into question.166
Only then did Earthjustice (the former Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund) enter
the legal fray.167 Today a practice that the mainstream environmental-law
agenda was arguably decades late in incorporating has produced what is
probably the largest topographic, hydrological, and ecological transformation
of a North American landscape in at least fifty years.168 The relative omission
of this issue in a decisive pair of decades is just one consequence of the form
that mainstream environmentalism took in the early and mid-1980s.
What accounts for the form in which the environmental movement
consolidated itself in the 1980s? There is contingency: Reuther’s death and the
self-immolation of Arnold Miller’s UMWA presidency cost environmentalists
potential allies; the Ford Foundation’s decision not to make a substantial grant
to Environmental Action, the nonprofit that organized Earth Day, reflected
Ford’s preference for expert and professional advocacy, but Ford’s effort in

165. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP MINING:
BACKGROUND ON CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 1 (2015) (noting that almost twelve hundred miles of
Appalachian streams were buried by surface coal mining practices between 1992 and 2011); EPA Issues
Comprehensive Guidance to Protect Appalachian Communities from Harmful Environmental Impacts of
Mountaintop Mining, EPA (Apr. 1, 2010), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4
379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/4145c96189a17239852576f8005867bd!OpenDocument (giving an
“estimate” of two thousand miles in total of Appalachian headwater streams that have been buried by
mountaintop coal mining).
166. See, e.g., Penny Loeb, Shear Madness, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 11, 1997, at 26
(reporting on mountaintop removal at the national level for the first time in the mid-1990s); Bragg v.
Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 663 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (invalidating a mountaintop removal streamfilling), vacated Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court);
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
167. Based on personal conversations with Steve Roady of Earthjustice and West Virginia
environmental litigator Joe Lovett, this has been a productive collaboration. Mountaintop removal
remains in public view today, despite the courtroom losses.
168. According to a 2016 study, significant parts of Central Appalachia have been transformed
from a mix of steep slopes and narrow but flat valley floors and ridgelines to a blend of nearly flat postmining plateaus and modest slopes. Matthew R. V. Ross et al., Deep Impact: Effects of Mountaintop
Mining on Surface Topography, Bedrock Structure, and Downstream Waters, 50 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH.
2064, 2064‒65 (2016). This terrain is the product of removing up to six hundred vertical feet of hill and
mountain and, in turn, burying valleys in as many vertical feet of overburden. See id. at 2067. The
characteristic hardwood forests of the region do not generally return, and overburden-filled valleys
retain about ten times more water than the pre-mining landforms did. See id. at 2064‒65. According to
Appalachian Voices, an advocacy group, mountaintop removal has eliminated more than five hundred
distinct mountains from the region’s terrain. ROSS GEREDIEN, APPALACHIAN VOICES, POSTMOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL RECLAMATION OF MOUNTAIN SUMMITS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
APPALACHIA 2 (2009) (prepared for Natural Resources Defense Council).
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developing the grant proposal indicates openness to more activism-oriented
environmentalism.169
But there were also tectonic shifts in politics and political economy that
helped to close the window that seemed to open in the early days of post-1970
environmental politics. At least part of the failure of justice-oriented
environmentalism to take institutional root seems to be owing to the political
economy of available funders and allies. The role of labor changed in a way
that restricted its potential as an environmental ally. As noted earlier, the breadand-butter labor movement that the corporatist NLRA model of collective
bargaining nurtured within the terms of the Treaty of Detroit had already
reduced most unions’ engagement with broader questions of power,
distribution, and social provision; Reuther’s UAW and, more markedly, the
Miners for Democracy were exceptions to this pattern. After the mid-1970s,
however, labor fell increasingly into a defensive position as blue-collar wages
stagnated and a decline in industrial employment set in; both of these trends
were accelerated by the deflationary monetary policy of the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Reuther’s social unionism had reflected a role that organized labor
played for some decades as the left wing of a set of civic, economic, and
political institutions that sat at the center of a loosely corporatist mutual
accommodation of economic interests. With Jimmy Carter’s 1976 election to
the presidency and Democratic congressional majorities, many labor leaders
and activists imagined an expansion and consolidation of New Deal and Great
Society commitments.170 When this agenda was shredded, signally in the illfated Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment bill, labor was served notice that
its settled place in American political economy was in question, a notice that
announced the beginning of a long, receding struggle for survival.
Whether one interprets these events as consequences of a more or less
agency-free shift in the distributional dynamics of capitalism, or as the product
of a deliberate political revolt of capital against the constraints of the postWorld War II accommodation, the result was the same: to put labor in a
defensive posture in which a zero-sum logic of “jobs versus environment”
named an urgently felt reality.171 Particularly after the failure on either side to
build deep or enduring labor-environmental alliances in the 1970s, when those
might have contributed to defining the scope and priorities of environmental
169. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 85, at 186‒87 (contending that in the aftermath of Earth Day,
“most groups felt an even more pressing need to professionalize”).
170. See COWIE, supra note 134, at 261‒312 (discussing in some political detail the aspirations
and demise of “the New Deal that never happened”).
171. Cf. Thomas Piketty, Toward a Reconciliation between Economics and the Social Sciences, in
AFTER PIKETTY: THE AGENDA FOR ECONOMICS AND INEQUALITY 543–65 (Heather Boushey & J.
Bradford DeLong eds., 2017). See generally PIKETTY, supra note 1 (arguing, seemingly, for an agencyfree, structural account of inequality); WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF
CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 3–6 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2014) (arguing that since the 1970s the
arrangements of mid-century social democracy have suffered a series of crises spurred by relation social
scarcity).
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law rather than simply expressing occasional tactical overlap, labor and
environmentalism had moved far apart by the 1980s. With no real prospect of
labor allies, it was all the easier for environmental groups to turn to the wealthy
donors who remain critical to their flourishing, and who, as a group, are not
great enthusiasts for class antagonism.
The shape of the post-1970 statutes played a role as well; CWA
enforcement litigation, which brings attorneys’ fees, became a staple of
environmental activism in the 1980s, when environmentalists substituted their
own enforcement efforts for the deliberate inactivity of the Reagan
Administration’s EPA.172 Neither donor nor statutory funding sources, then,
drove environmental groups to cultivate the strands of work that would have
made environmental justice commitments central.
There was, then, a two-stage creation of the mainstream environmentalism
whose blind spots and exclusions were among the reasons that environmental
justice arose in its current form. The first stage was in the decline in attention to
distributive politics, the workplace, and economic order in the period when
post-1960 environmentalism and post-1970 environmental law were taking
form, a decline that I have traced in part to the political economy of the postWar period. The second stage came in the 1970s and early 1980s, when
mainstream environmentalism mostly failed to take up the more justiceoriented themes that had never disappeared from grassroots activism.
The environmental law that the environmental justice movement first
defined itself by criticizing deserved much of the criticism. That version of
environmental law, however, was a product of more recent events than either
its participants or its critics entirely recognized. A forgetfulness shared between
the mainstream and its critics has diminished attention to the long
environmental justice movement, which persisted from the early twentieth
century through the ferment of the 1970s. That forgetfulness may have
contributed, also, to a too-ready acceptance of a rather specialized and
supplemental role for environmental justice considerations within the larger
body of environmental law: as a mandatory procedural consideration in
administrative decisions and a tactical resource in political fights over siting
hazardous facilities. These roles matter, but they are narrower than the
invitation that environmental justice makes: to take seriously the question of
inequality in the human environments that law pervasively shapes. They are
narrower, too, than the interest in economic power, the workplace, and political
accountability that animated the long history of environmental justice. The next
Part argues that an expansive view of the meaning of environmental justice—in
both its recent and its long versions—can help to identify the justice
dimensions of issues outside today’s core legal operation of environmental
justice considerations. It also argues that thinking about these less conventional

172.

See ANDREWS, supra note 19, at 255‒62 (discussing this period).
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environmental justice questions helps to clarify more generally environmental
law’s relation to questions of inequality.
V. AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE APPROACH TO FOOD SYSTEMS
Although agricultural issues received intensive legal attention throughout
the twentieth century, from food-safety regulation to farming subsidies, they
never became central to environmental law. Their marginality was
overdetermined; much early environmental discourse was indifferent to
agriculture, institutionalized movement-building long followed suit, and
agricultural industries won exemptions from much post-1970 environmental
regulation. Those exemptions, in turn, limited the opportunity of environmental
advocacy groups and enforcement agencies to orient themselves toward
agricultural questions.
This Part addresses two aspects of the American food system: first, the air
and water pollution connected with concentrated animal feeding operations
(CAFOs) and, second, the allocation of productive resources to corn-andsoybean-based calories through statutory crop supports. It argues that
understanding these as environmental justice issues is illuminating in a pair of
ways. First, concentration of weakly regulated air and water pollution from
CAFOs in regions with vulnerable populations compromises the original
environmental justice commitment of the anti-pollution statutes: setting a limit
on exposure to air and water pollution as a kind of right for all, regardless of
who or where one is. For agencies to develop aggressive and enforceable
regulation in this area would vindicate an environmental justice commitment
that already exists in the statutes, though it is not conventionally articulated as
such. Second, the food environment that agricultural law shapes is, like air and
water, a bearer of disparate health hazards. The fact that individual consumer
decisions about what food to buy and eat mediates these hazards does not
diminish their significance as environmental justice considerations, but rather
highlights their importance as such.
A. Pollution Risk from Food Production
In roughly the past forty years, with a sharp acceleration in the 1980s,
commercial meat production has moved from relatively small-scale, mixed
grain-and-livestock operations to a smaller number of much larger and
specialized operations.173 Central to the new meat economy are the industrial173. For an overview of the state of animal production in the pork industry, which has seen
especially dramatic concentration, see NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. HOG INDUSTRY (2009). Large feeding operations have grown in number, small
operations have fallen, and as of 2012, 96 percent of U.S. pork production took place in CAFOs with
more than 1000 hogs, which the EPA defines as a “large” CAFO. Number of U.S. Hog Operations by
Size Groups and Percent of Inventory, PORK CHECKOFF, http://www.pork.org/pork-quickfacts/home/stats/structure-and-productivity/number-of-u-s-hog-operations-by-size-groups-and-percent-
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scale enterprises that the EPA designates as CAFOs.174 A CAFO generally
houses one thousand to twenty-five hundred hogs in a building (typically in a
cluster of similarly sized buildings), many thousands of chickens in a similar
facility, or at least one thousand cattle in a feedlot.
Like the rest of the food system, CAFOs are deeply shaped by the law. It
is widely understood that the anti-pollution statutes substantially exempted
most farming activity from regulation, and that such “non-point-source”
pollution as fertilizer runoff remains a major barrier to statutory clean-water
goals; agricultural greenhouse-gas emissions now similarly pose problems for
climate-change policy.175 Although the CWA applies to CAFOs explicitly and
the CAA reaches them in principle, enforcement has persistently lagged CAFO
growth.176 Regulatory foot-dragging and exemptions, the difficulty of
monitoring agricultural emissions even in concentrated operations, and the
political power of agriculture have interacted to limit effective regulatory
attention to CAFO pollution.177 CAFOs also gain competitive advantages from
subsidies to corn and soybeans, which press the cost of CAFO feed stock below
market levels.178
of-inventory/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (citing figures from 2012 USDA Census of Agriculture); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(4) (2017) (EPA definition of “large” CAFO).
174. EPA, REGULATORY DEFINITIONS OF LARGE CAFOS, MEDIUM CAFO, AND SMALL CAFOS,
https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/sector_table.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (giving CAFO definition
for a variety of meat-producing species). A CAFO is defined as a point source of water pollution in the
Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
175. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (“This term [‘point source’] does not include agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”). Estimates of the contribution of
agriculture to climate change range from an EPA ascription of 7.4 percent of U.S. greenhouse gases to
agriculture to a Pew estimate that puts industrial agriculture at 18 percent of global greenhouse gas
emissions. See EPA, INVENTORY OF THE U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2005 ES12 (2007); ROLF U. HALDEN & KELLOGG J. SCHWAB, PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD.,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION 22 (2006).
176. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (listing CAFOs under the Clean Water Act’s definition of a “point
source” of water pollution). EPA did not develop a comprehensive regulatory program for CAFO
pollutants until required to do so under a consent decree. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Reilly, No. 892980 (RCL), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5334, at *28–*29 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1991) (resulting in a consent
decree). In the meantime, Congress in 1987 exempted “agricultural stormwater discharges” and
“agricultural return flows” from the statutory definition of “point source.” See Act of Feb. 4, 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-4, § 503, 101 Stat. 7, 75. These exemptions have been interpreted to limit the scope of EPA’s
authority to regulate CAFOs. See Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 501–02 (2d Cir. 2005)
(discussing the statutory limits on EPA’s CAFO regulation). Similarly, EPA has generally declined to
develop Clean Air Act standards for CAFOs, despite being significant sources of hydrogen sulfide,
ammonia, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, and greenhouse gases. See Teresa B.
Clemmer, Agriculture and the Clean Air Act, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 163,
163‒69 (Mary Jane Angelo et al. eds., 2013).
177. For instance, in North Carolina, waste lagoons were not required to include anti-seepage
lining or to observe a minimum setback from streams and rivers before 1997, when the state adopted its
first Clean Water Act permitting requirements for CAFOs. Many of those lagoons remain in use.
Current regulations require a minimum setback of 100 feet from perennial streams. 15A N.C. ADMIN.
CODE 2T.0506 (2017).
178. The structure and effect of these subsidies is discussed in Part V.B. For a treatment of their
contribution to the competitiveness of CAFOs, see ELANOR STARMER AND TIMOTHY A. WISE, GLOBAL
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CAFOs also depend on the use of sub-therapeutic doses of antibiotics as a
prophylaxis against epidemics among their closely confined populations.179
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval is necessary for use of
antibiotics in commercial livestock operations, and has become increasingly
controversial in light of growing awareness that pervasive, low-level antibiotics
use increases the likelihood of antibiotic-resistant bacterial strains emerging.
The Centers for Disease Control in 2013 called the threat from antibioticresistant bacterial strains “potentially catastrophic” (not with specific reference
to livestock administration) and urged “immediate action.”180 The problem of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria that might be bred inadvertently in the food system
itself deserves attention as an environmental threat; NRDC recognized as much
in bringing the recent suit that helped to force the FDA’s attention to the
issue.181 For this discussion’s purposes, though, the regulatory tolerance of subtherapeutic antibiotics represents another way that the prominence of CAFOs in
meat production results from legal tolerance of CAFO risks and thus arguably
amounts to a regulatory subsidy that shapes the country’s food system toward
concentrated, industrial-style production, and in turn entails a further specific
distribution of environmental risk and harm.
The distribution of environmental burdens from CAFOs creates something
approaching a series of regional exceptions to the strong egalitarian policy of
the anti-pollution statutes. Because those statutes created strong nationwide
standards for air quality and water pollution, their architects understood them as
DEV. & ENV’T INST., TUFTS UNIVERSITY, FEEDING AT THE TROUGH: INDUSTRIAL LIVESTOCK FIRMS
SAVED $35 BILLION FROM LOW FEED PRICES 1 (2007), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB0703FeedingAtTroughDec07.pdf.
179. Sub-therapeutic doses are aimed at “increased rate of weight gain” and disease prevention but
are not intended to treat disease. 21 C.F.R. §§ 558.55–558.680 (2017).
180. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2013). The Centers for Disease Control
report goes on to urge caution in livestock administration of antibiotics, recommending in particular that
antibiotics be used under veterinary supervision and only for disease control (not weight gain, another
traditional use). Id. at 36‒38. At that time, the FDA had nominally been studying the issue since 1970,
when it first instituted a task force, which, in 1972, recommended withdrawing approval of all subtherapeutic antibiotic administration to protect public health. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. FDA, 760
F.3d 151, 154 (2d. Cir. 2014). Hearings on a proposed withdrawal of approval were announced in 1977
but never held, and the question was dormant until a spate of suits in the last decade sought to restart the
process. See, e.g., id. at 153 (reversing a district court ruling that had sided with NRDC in holding that
FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ending the withdrawal process after an initial finding by the
director that livestock administration of antibiotics had not been shown to be safe for public health). The
suits ended in defeat for the environmentalist plaintiffs, and the FDA has issued only nonbinding
recommendations to discipline livestock antibiotics administration. See id.; see also FDA, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY NO. 213: NEW ANIMAL DRUGS AND NEW
ANIMAL DRUG COMBINATION PRODUCTS ADMINISTERED IN OR ON MEDICATED FEED OR DRINKING
WATER OF FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRUG SPONSORS FOR VOLUNTARILY
ALIGNING PRODUCT USE CONDITIONS WITH GFI #209 (Dec. 2013). California in 2015 passed a statute
prohibiting the use of antibiotics for livestock weight gain and requiring other uses to be subject to
veterinary supervision; whether this change will be consequential remains to be seen. See S. 27, 2015‒
16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (codified at CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 14400–14408 (2017)).
181. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 760 F.3d at 153.
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connected with the larger agenda of racial and economic justice and as creating,
in effect if not in form, a right to clean air and clean water.182 Permissive
regulation of the regionally concentrated CAFO industry produces
economically and racially disparate vulnerability that violates the anti-pollution
statutes’ animating expectation of a nationally shared baseline of clean water
and air. That expectation, recall, was the primary response of the statutes’
architects to criticism from Nader-led environmental justice advocates.
CAFOs produce an enormous amount of animal waste, and although some
of it is applied to farmland for its fertilizing properties, much of it contains
more nitrogen and phosphorous than available soil can absorb, and so turns a
potentially beneficial substance into a waste-disposal problem.183 Regions
where CAFOs have flourished are also those where the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) reports high incidence of the biologically excessive
nutrient levels that make agriculture the main contributor to American
waterways remaining out of compliance with the CWA.184 Although animal
waste from those CAFOs that are designated CWA point sources generally
must be stored in a manner that isolates it from surface and groundwater, the
lagoons that serve this purpose spill, leak, and mingle surface water during
floods.185 Fish kills, algae blooms, contamination of downstream shellfish, and
human exposure to bacteria, pathogens, and toxic levels of nitrates all
follow.186
CAFOs also produce air pollution. Although agriculture has become
mildly notorious for the share of greenhouse-gas emissions that is traceable to
animal production, CAFOs also emit fine particulates as well as hydrogen
182.
183.

See supra notes 62‒65 and accompanying text (Muskie on this topic).
A very large CAFO, with 800,000 hogs, would produce 1.6 million tons of waste per year, as
much as the City of Philadelphia. CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH,
UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
COMMUNITIES 2 (2010). More than 115 million hogs are raised for slaughter in the United States each
year. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER 2016 SUMMARY
8 (2017).
184. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31851, ANIMAL WASTE AND WATER
QUALITY: EPA REGULATION OF CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (CAFOS) 1‒3 (2010)
(reporting a significant increase in the number of U.S. counties with nutrient imbalances and their
prevalence in CAFO-rich regions).
185. For instance, in North Carolina, waste lagoons were not required to include anti-seepage
lining or to observe a minimum setback from streams and rivers before 1997, when the state adopted its
first Clean Water Act permitting requirements for CAFOs. Many of those lagoons remain in use.
Current regulations require a minimum setback of 100 feet from perennial streams. 15A N.C. ADMIN.
CODE 2T.0506 (2017).
186. See COPELAND, supra note 184, at 4‒5 (on animal waste and the environment); M.E.
Anderson & M.D. Sobsey, Detection and Occurrence of Antimicrobially Resistant E. Coli in
Groundwater on or Near Swine Farms in Eastern North Carolina, 54 WATER SCI. & TECH., no. 3, Aug.
2006, at 211, 217‒18 (finding contamination of groundwater near lagoons with high levels of antibioticresistant E. coli). For a vivid portrayal of the effects of recent flooding in the Carolinas on the
widespread CAFOs of those states’ coastal regions, see Tom Philpott, Hurricane Matthew Killed
Millions of Farm Animals in North Carolina, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.mother
jones.com/environment/2016/10/hurricane-matthew-killed-animals-hog-poop.
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sulfide and other volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which have significant
effects on health and quality of life in the local area.187 CAFOs also house
airborne biological agents, including bacteria and mold spores, as well as
various allergens.188
These local and regional environmental burdens of animal agriculture are
distributed unevenly with respect to poverty and race. Researchers have found
different degrees of correlation—some negligible, some significant—between
the location of CAFOs and the percentage of low-income and nonwhite
populations in otherwise comparable areas, with especially strong correlations
for poultry CAFOs and for low-income and Latino populations.189 A broaderbrush description, while it comes at the cost of some precision, captures a
larger pattern that is important here. The regions where CAFOs have expanded
most rapidly tend to resist fine-grained intra-regional contrasts precisely
because, like the North Carolina coastal plain, the Delmarva Peninsula, and
other rural regions of the low-country South, they are pervasively poor and, in
many cases, heavily nonwhite. There is no need to rely on racial or other
targeting, such as was often claimed in early environmental justice cases and
has been much investigated in the empirical literature on toxins. Nor is it
necessary to rely on the alternative explanation, rearrangement of intra-regional
populations by market dynamics after CAFOs have been cited, to appreciate
that these facilities are pervasive in parts of the country where there are many
nonwhite people and relatively few wealthy or highly-educated individuals—
not just near the CAFOs, but anywhere in shouting distance. Taking one swipe
at this issue, Steve Wing and Jill Johnston estimated that, when they examined
a broad swath of North Carolina to compare CAFO and non-CAFO localities
(but excluded dense urban areas and western mountain counties, which have no
hog CAFOs), the proportion of African Americans and Latinos within three
miles of hog CAFOs was respectively 1.54 and 1.39 times that of non-Hispanic
whites.190 They found that in census blocks with at least 80 percent people of
187. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32948, AIR QUALITY ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A
PRIMER 2‒4 (2016).
188. Id. at 4.
189. See e.g., Kelley J. Dunham et al., Community Health and Socioeconomic Issues surrounding
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 317, 318 (2007) (finding race
and income correlations for hog CAFOs); S.M. Rafael Harun & Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger,
Distribution of Industrial Farms in the United States and Socioeconomic, Health, and Environmental
Characteristics, GEOGRAPHY J., 2013, at 6, 10 (finding significant correlations only for chicken CAFOs
at the county level); Sacoby M. Wilson et al., Environmental Injustice and the Mississippi Hog Industry,
110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 195, 197 (2002) (finding race and income correlations for hog CAFOs); cf.
JEN HORTON, THE SITING OF INDUSTRIAL HOG FARMING OPERATIONS IN EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA:
A CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 108–12 (2012) (master’s degree thesis comparing areas within
one- and three-mile radii of hog CAFOs with random areas in the same regions and finding little
correlation with race, somewhat more with educational level, and growing disparities in home values
between the two sets of samples).
190. STEVE WING & JILL JOHNSTON, INDUSTRIAL HOG OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT AFRICAN-AMERICANS, HISPANICS AND AMERICAN INDIANS 1 (2014),
http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/UNC-Report.pdf.
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color, the share of the population living within 3 miles of a hog CAFO was
twice as high as in other census blocks.191 As they rather vividly put it, for
every ten percentage-point increase in the share of people of color in a North
Carolina census block, the weight of hog waste produced annually within three
miles of that block grows by fifty tons.192
In the absence of richer and more precise evidence of substantial and
disparate harm from weak CAFO regulation, the strength of my claim must
remain conditional. That said, there exists a real cause for concern that the antipollution statutes are not doing their work, resulting in precisely the disparate
impact that these statutes were meant to avert. Remedying this situation would
not require statutory amendment, like eliminating the CWA’s exemption for
“non-point source” agricultural pollution, nor changing Supreme Court
doctrine, like reviving disparate-impact claims after Washington v. Davis193
and Alexander v. Sandoval.194 It would only mean doing the equality-securing
work that the statutes were written to do.
B. Food, Health Risk, and Economic Inequality
Since the New Deal, the American food economy has been pervasively
shaped by federal regulation well beyond the farm. The modern era of
agricultural law began with New Deal federal crop insurance and the
production controls of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (best recalled in legal
circles for having been upheld in Wickard v. Filburn).195 In recent decades, the
Farm Bill, which is reauthorized roughly every five years, has directed
hundreds of billions of dollars to farmers in direct payments to commodity
producers (growers of corn, soybeans, and certain other relatively imperishable
“commodity crops”) and in subsidized insurance for shortfalls in production or
revenue (the latter on account of either low production or low prices). The 2014
Farm Bill directed $21 billion over 5 years to commodity-support programs and
$44 billion to general crop insurance subsidies, for which a broader range of
crops is eligible.196

191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (finding no equal protection claim from a
showing of disparate racial impact absent evidence of purposeful discrimination by an official actor).
194. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that disparate-impact
regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act do not give rise to
individual causes of action).
195. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 117 (1942); Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L.
No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31; see also Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768
(repealed 1938). The 1906 Act paved the way for the eventual creation of the FDA.
196. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649. For budgetary breakdown, see
RENÉE JOHNSON & JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22131, WHAT IS THE FARM BILL? 5
(2014). Over the decades, including in the early twenty-first century, these subsidies have often taken
the form of direct payments to farmers on the basis of historical levels of production on their acreage, or
of “top-off” price subsidies to bring farmers’ per-unit income to a floor that was often above market

44.4 PURDY V2 FOR JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

860

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

4/3/18 1:07 PM

[Vol. 44:809

Farm supports contribute to what public-health scholars call an
“obesogenic” food environment, one tending to produce obesity by presenting
people with abundant, inexpensive, calorie-rich foods heavy in sugars and fats,
while keeping fruits and vegetables relatively expensive.197 According to the
Centers for Disease Control, 36.5 percent of American adults are obese, with
rates reaching 48 percent among African Americans and 42.5 percent among
Latinos.198 In 2007, USDA researchers reported that the average American’s
daily calorie intake had increased by four hundred calories since 1985, and by
six hundred calories since 1970.199 Most of these calories came from increased
consumption of grains, sugars, and fats (the last mostly vegetable oils).200 The
increase in caloric intake drew most heavily on the most intensively subsidized
food sources. Among grains, corn calories rose 191 percent.201 Corn sweetener
calories, chiefly high-fructose corn syrup, rose 359 percent to 246 daily calories
for the average American; they represent in themselves a very significant share
of the total caloric increase.202 Calories from salads and cooking oils increased
by 260 percent; 70 percent of these calories come from heavily subsidized
soybeans.203
The social cost of diet-related health problems is considerable. Obesity
and follow-on ailments cost the U.S. health system as much as $190 billion
annually.204 The annual cost of diabetes alone (not restricted to the share
attributable to diet) has been estimated at $176 billion in medical care and an
additional $69 billion in lost productivity.205 As noted earlier, these medical
burdens are distributed in patterns that track other dimensions of disadvantage:
obesity rates are significantly higher in African American and Latino
populations than among whites; among women, obesity is greater among those
with less education.206 Rates of diagnosed diabetes are under 8 percent for non-

level. At present, commodity-support spending takes the form of subsidized insurance policies that pay
out in the event of either low production or low prices.
197. See David Wallinga, Agricultural Policy and Childhood Obesity: A Food Systems and Public
Health Commentary, 29 HEALTH AFF. 405, 405‒10 (2010); cf. JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN:
OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM 116‒39 (2011) (arguing that the “cheap
calories” argument is too simple to account for obesity, and assigning responsibility to concentrated
market power and low pay for workers).
198. Adult Obesity Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2017).
199. Wallinga, supra note 197, at 405‒06.
200. Id. at 405.
201. Id. at 406.
202. Id.; see also ALICIA HARVIE & TIMOTHY A. WISE, GLOBAL DEV. & ENV’T INST., TUFTS
UNIV., SWEETENING THE POT: IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES TO CORN SWEETENERS AND THE U.S. OBESITY
EPIDEMIC (2009), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB09-01SweeteningPotFeb09.pdf.
203. Wallinga, supra note 197, at 406.
204. John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An Instrumental
Variables Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219, 226 (2012).
205. Wenya Yang et al., Economic Costs of Diabetes Care in the U.S. in 2012, 36 DIABETES CARE
1033, 1033 (2013).
206. See Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 198.
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Hispanic whites, over 12 percent for Latinos, and over 13 percent for nonHispanic African Americans.207 And diabetes takes a greater toll among the
poor and uneducated: both having dropped out of high school and living in
poverty are correlated, after correcting for confounding variables, with risks of
dying from diabetes twice as high as for those who hold a college degree or live
in a high-income household, respectively.208
The contribution of an environmental justice analysis here is to propose
seeing the food system as an environmental medium that distributes exposure
to health risk. The medium of exposure is food prices. Subsidized corn and
soybean production, combined with a near-absence of policy support for fruit
and vegetable production, produces a vast stockpile of potential calories from
the subsidized goods, driving down the relative prices of foods derived from
them. Between 1985 and 2000, for instance, the inflation-adjusted price of
carbonated soft drinks fell by nearly 24 percent, while the price of fresh fruits
and vegetables rose by 39 percent.209
Of course, there is a vivid difference between traditional environmental
risks, paradigmatically pollution, and the risks produced and distributed
through the food system. Exposure to pollution is generally involuntary and
widely shared, which contributed to Rachel Carson’s rhetorical comparison of
toxins to nuclear fallout in Silent Spring. The risks under discussion here
always rely on the individual choice to purchase and consume food, meaning
they are neither generally shared nor involuntary. Can such risks be said to be
environmental, let alone concerns of environmental justice?
Here the intellectual resources of the environmental justice tradition cast
light on the question. The reason that the roots of pollution politics and science
lie partly in workplace safety issues, including unions’ struggles around
working conditions, is precisely the recognition that there are layers of choice
and determination in any decision. The Workers’ Health Bureau of the 1920s,
for instance, operated in a political and legal environment in which the
paradigm case of voluntary action was the labor contract.210 But as labor and
Legal Realist critics argued, while workers and employers chose the terms of
their contracts, they did not choose the conditions in which they contracted, and
207. Statistics about Diabetes, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-basics/
statistics/ (last updated July 19, 2017).
208. See Sharon Saydah & Kimberly Lochner, Socioeconomic Status and Risk of Diabetes-Related
Mortality in the U.S., 125 PUB. HEALTH REP. 377, 387 (2010). High school dropouts are more than 60
percent more likely to have diabetes than people with some college education. A 2007 National Bureau
of Economic Research study concluded that education made a significant difference in risk even
accounting for correlated risk factors. See JAMES SMITH, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
DIABETES AND THE RISE OF THE SES HEALTH GRADIENT 17 (2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w12905.pdf.
209. See Wallinga, supra note 197, at 407 (reporting estimates derived from USDA figures).
210. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (putting liberty of contract at the center of
the “liberty” term of the Due Process Clause, with specific reference to a labor agreement); Jedediah
Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 4, 2014, at 195, 196‒98 (discussing the usefulness and limitations of later comparisons to Lochner).
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these did much to constitute the scope of their effective options.211 Likewise,
consumers choose their meals, but not the background of food prices and
consequent tradeoffs that result from their choices. The exercise of food choice
is conditioned by the intersection of price-shaping agricultural policy, on the
one hand, and the distribution of income and wealth, on the other.212 And
eating, after all, is no more optional than breathing. The fact that what one eats
is always a choice means that every meal is an opportunity for economic
inequality to translate into different levels of risk exposure.213
What should be the response? The Farm Bill’s subsidies are typically
revisited every five years, and there have recently been some progressive
efforts by environmental and public-health groups to redirect it toward smallerscale operations and healthier crops.214 Partly in response to public interest in
food issues, environmental organizations have sought legal hooks to engage
food production.215 Here the first line of potential action is almost certainly
political, and would involve an effort to join justice-oriented and environmental
constituencies around a newly shared sense of a common problem. Although
“Congress should change the law” is an unsatisfying prescription nowadays for
reasons that need no rehearsing, political circumstances can change. When they
do, advocates should be clear on which questions they regard as environmental
justice priorities, and why. The law-shaped food environment belongs among
those.
C. Summary
A more complete analysis of the food system’s relevance to environmental
justice would integrate issues that this discussion has not reached, and that
would further test the borders of the topic. These include the disproportionate
decline in African American farm ownership under USDA lending policies that

211. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470, 474–79 (1923) (arguing that legal structure has pervasive influence on supposedly
voluntary decisions); cf. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 175 (2003) (arguing an updated version of the same thesis, though with an interest in subtle
decision cues rather than “coercion”).
212. See, e.g., Andrea Freeman, The 2014 Farm Bill: Farm Subsidies and Food Oppression, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1275–77 (2015) (arguing along these lines).
213. Of course, the ways that economic inequality distributes exposure to unsafe air has long been
a concern for environmental justice. There is considerable opportunity to spend money controlling the
kind of water to which one is exposed, whether through living in Westchester rather than Flint or
through purchases of drinking water. I do not mean to say that these risks are not structured by
inequality-plus-choice, but only that diet-related risks are much more pervasively structured in this
manner.
214. For instance, the National Law School Farm Bill Research Consortium has been working for
a decade to design such reforms for the Farm Bill. Representatives from the Yale Environmental
Protection Clinic, the Harvard Food Law and Policy Clinic, the Resnick Program for Food Law and
Policy, and others contribute to this effort.
215. See, for example, the NRDC litigation on sub-therapeutic antibiotic use in CAFOs, discussed
above in Part V.A.
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effectively facilitated racial exclusion by local lending boards;216 highly
concentrated ownership in the industries that purchase and process farmed
goods, which is widely reported to affect prices and contract terms for farmers,
especially small and mid-sized ones;217 and the low pay and high rates of injury
and toxic exposure that workers experience in many areas of agricultural
production and processing, not least because of the substantial exemption of
farm labor from the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.218 Whether
these are questions of environmental justice per se, or simply aspects of the
distributional political economy of the food system, is probably not a question
with a conceptually required answer, so much as it is a matter of the work that
advocates, movements, and officials seek to do with the categories of
“environmental problem” and “environmental justice.” If they define risks to
health from the law-shaped food system as paradigm problems, and demand
both the intentional provision of a healthful food environment and the
enforcement of basic anti-pollution commitments against industrial-scale
agricultural operations in regions whose populations are already socially
vulnerable, they will have made the law’s role in this field a central question of
environmental justice.
CONCLUSION
Since its emergence as a self-aware movement in the 1980s,
environmental justice has shaped environmental law in ways that go well
beyond the procedural requirements of Executive Order 12898. In particular, it
has infused awareness of disparate impacts and racial inequality into the
activity of agencies and professional and advocacy organizations. Both
procedural mandates and institutional measures adopted voluntarily in response
to justice claims have expanded the range of interests and perspectives
represented in environmental decision making and advocacy, and inserted
questions of fairness into every stage and site of deliberation, from goal setting

216. See HOSSEIN AYAZI & ELSADIG ELSHEIKH, HAAS INST. FOR A FAIR & INCLUSIVE SOC’Y, THE
U.S. FARM BILL: CORPORATE POWER AND STRUCTURAL RACIALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES FOOD
SYSTEM 52‒60 (2015) (examining the Farm Service Agency lending programs, Farm Bill commodity
programs, and Farm Bill Rural Development programs).
217. A decade ago, Mary Hendrickson and William Heffernan of the University of Missouri
estimated the market share of the largest 4 firms in the following areas: beef packers, 84 percent in 2005,
up from 72 percent in 1990; pork packers, 64 percent in 2005, up from 40 percent in 1990; flour milling
(from commodity grain) 63 percent, up from 40 percent in 1982. See MARY HENDRICKSON & WILLIAM
HEFFERNAN, DEPT. OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY, UNIV. OF MO., CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL
MARKETS 1, 2 (2007), http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/07contable.pdf.
218. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2012) (exempting agricultural workers from
overtime pay and minimum wage requirements). But see Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801‒1872 (prescribing wage protections, housing and transportation
safety standards, farm labor contractor registration requirements, and disclosure requirements for
agricultural workers).
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to administrative enforcement and permitting processes. But there is still more
to learn.
The first step is recognizing the historical trajectory of the long
environmental justice movement, the circumstances of the mid-twentieth
century that narrowed its concerns to more conventionally “environmental”
ones, and the events of the 1970s that helped to produce the “mainstream
environmentalism” that environmental justice defined itself by criticizing. The
limitations in environmental law that environmental justice points out are the
products of assumptions that no longer hold: that economic inequality was
declining, that legal liberalism was an adequate mode of advocacy, that
environmental law making could rely on legal mechanisms outside the
environmental statutes to address disparate impact. In the 1970s, as these
assumptions were coming under pressure, environmental law took institutional
forms that, for all their achievements, continued its relative neglect of
distribution, participation, and the total human environment. The repair of these
omissions tends to make questions of justice an integral part of the work of
environmental law. This reintegration of justice questions reflects two
recognitions: that inequality will not decline spontaneously or for exogenous
reasons, and that expert officials and advocates should not be certain that they
know what justice might require in advance of a political argument over exactly
that question. Inasmuch as environmental law grapples with these problems, it
is beginning to reenter the long movement for environmental justice.

We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles
may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.

